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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Negotiations are now actively under way to resolve the Cyprus conflict, 
re-unify the island and secure the accession of the whole of the Cyprus to 
the European Union (EU) in the near future. Given these promising 
developments, but the naturally confidential nature of the negotiations (of 
which the authors have no inside knowledge), a paper such as the present 
one has to identify its purpose. Our idea has been to apply to the case of 
Cyprus a digest of information on: 
a)  the experience of multi-tier government structures in advanced 
democracies, and in particular in bi-ethnic or multi-ethnic societies; 
b)  the experience of how such structures can fit in with the evolving 
system of the European Union, and its policies and division of 
competences, with special reference to the case of Belgium; and 
c)  models for exit from situations of inter-communal conflict.  
The paper is therefore a description of the tool kit of governance systems 
and EU policy mechanisms that could in principle be used to support the 
simultaneous re-unification and EU accession of Cyprus. The paper is 
not to be taken as recommending a solution, which only the principal 
parties can work out. Rather, it is a discussion of the options that the 
parties may consider, structured so as to be relevant to the negotiations. 
Where the text speaks of elements that ‘would’ be part of the solution, 
this is because they are either non-controversial or requirements of EU 
accession. 
We draw on the substantial work done by the UN in its ‘Set of Ideas’ of 
1992, the text of which is reproduced in an annex. Even if that exercise 
failed to reach a conclusion, the document advanced many elements that 
had considerable support from the two parties at that time. What was 
missing then, both technically in the text and politically, was a 
sufficiently vivid and powerful incentive of EU accession to overcome 
the resistance to an agreement. That incentive does exist today, although 
some difficult issues remain to be resolved, and the further decade of 
separation since 1992 makes re-unification more difficult still.  
Institutions  
Models of the political institutions that might be adopted in a re-unified 
Cyprus are described, but without labelling them as either federal or EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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confederal. The EU integration factor makes neither term adequate. We 
try to use neutral language wherever possible, i.e. avoiding terms that 
imply a choice not yet agreed by the parties. We therefore refer to the 
future Cyprus as a common state and member state of the UN and EU, 
composed of two constituent states.
1 
A key point of institutional design is to reconcile as best as possible the 
sometimes contradictory principles of political equality on the one hand 
(traditional priority for the Turkish side), versus fairness in representation 
and effectiveness in decision-making on the other (traditional priority for 
the Greek side).  
Two methods for achieving these objectives are discussed in the political 
science literature, firstly techniques for guaranteeing power-sharing, and 
secondly techniques to induce convergent political behaviour between the 
communities. A blend of both a pproaches would seem useful, and 
examples are set out.  
The representation of Cyprus and its communities in the institutions of 
the EU is sketched. Of particular importance will be the coordination of 
the position of Cyprus in EU policy-making between the common state 
and constituent state levels. Here the experience of Belgium, as a 
decentralised bi-ethnic/community member state of the EU, is worth 
close study.  
The transition from the present situation and the future regime will 
require special arrangements. Here we make an important distinction 
between, on the one hand, short-term and purely technical transitional 
arrangements and, on the other hand, the idea of longer-term systemic 
evolution. Even if all the elements of the conflict are settled, it may not 
be possible or desirable to try to jump in one step to a new definitive 
constitutional regime.  
Kompetenz Katalog 
This German expression, meaning the system of distribution of policy 
competences in a multi-tier governmental setting such as the EU, is used 
because it becomes the effective name of the EU’s own work on this 
subject in the framework of the Convention initiated at Laeken in 
December 2001. The point for Cyprus is that it will be working out its 
own internal Kompetenz Katalog in parallel with the EU, with so much 
                                                 
1 The terms‘common state’ and ‘constituent states’ may also become politicised, 
but we use them since they have no commonly accepted definition either in 
practice or the political science literature. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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overlap between the two exercises that they have to be considered 
together. In practice the EU system is going to shape a large part of the 
internal Cyprus solution, which should make its agreement easier.  
For monetary policy the whole of Cyprus would probably accede to the 
euro area after two years of EU membership. This transfers the policy 
competence largely to EU level, but leaves open the possibility for the 
central bank to delegate to its branches in the constituent states a role in 
supervising financial institutions (German model).   
Much of the economic legal order for the internal market and freedom of 
movement of goods, services, labour and capital will be set in the so-
called  acquis (the acquired stock of EU laws). Special measures to 
accommodate the sensitive issue of acquisition of property could be 
envisaged and agreed with the EU. The rights deriving from the EU 
acquis should however be distinguished from refugee rights in Cyprus. 
The latter would be settled in the context of an initial settlement, while 
acquis rights may be implemented over time. Entry of the whole of 
Cyprus into the EU would also mean automatically joining the EU’s 
customs union with Turkey and of course abolition of all present trade 
restrictions. 
For the budgetary system of the re-unified Cyprus, there is a wealth of 
experience in advanced, multi-tier government systems, with clearly 
identified models for taxation, social security finance and revenue 
redistribution to choose from. These choices may be influenced, and 
pressures for inter-community redistribution eased, by grants and loans 
from the EU institutions. These funds would be largely aimed at  the 
economic catch-up of northern Cyprus, which could proceed at an 
impressive speed as long as the political settlement is perceived as 
credible for investors. The tax revenues of the common state might 
naturally rely first of all on the value added tax and corporation tax.  
In several sectors, such as  energy, transport and environment policy, 
competences are likely to be shared by all three tiers of government – the 
EU, the common state and the constituent states. Experience within the 
EU, especially Belgium, suggest these allocations of competence may 
best be done at a quite disaggregated level. 
The education system would surely be a competence of the constituent 
states; as the communities begin to mingle, however, special needs will in 
due course overlap the territorial borders, and there are some models to 
bear in mind here.  
Axiomatically there would be single Cyprus citizenship. While the legal 
criteria will have to be established by the common state, aspects of its EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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implementation might be decentralised. The movement of persons across 
the external border will be heavily determined by EU and Schengen law, 
and special transitional arrangements could be envisaged by EU to avoid 
new restrictions such as visa requirements between Cyprus and Turkey. 
Foreign policy would call for a major responsibility at the common state 
level, but here also modern Europe sees examples of partial 
decentralisation for the external aspects of sub-national policy 
competences. The demilitarised island would not need an army or 
defence policy (beyond international and EU guarantees). 
Territory, refugees and security 
These aspects are in practice highly interdependent. Adjustments to the 
present territorial border could accommodate a considerable part of 
demands for refugee return. The present report does not presume to 
identify precise solutions on these questions but discusses some issues 
concerning refugee return and compensation, as well as design of the 
future security order in Cyprus.  
On security guarantees attention is given to how the 1959 Treaty of 
Guarantee could be amended, partly through using some key provisions 
of the EU Treaties (Articles 6 and 7 of the TEU). A peacekeeping force 
would be needed for some time, presumably alongside a progressive de-
militarisation of the island. As regards the organisation of peacekeeping 
forces, options are discussed for possible UN, NATO or  EU roles, 
alongside forces from Greece and Turkey.  
Concerning territorial readjustments, refugee return and compensation, 
detailed work has already been carried out by the UN, particularly in the 
1992 Set of Ideas. Since then the problem of property rights has been 
subject to judgements by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
These decisions will no doubt affect the current negotiations and possible 
agreements. However, political agreements between the two 
communities, which would have the highest international legal status, 
would provide a fresh framework for future Court cases.  
Conclusions 
In the course of preparing this report the authors have become 
increasingly persuaded that the simultaneous re-unification of Cyprus and 
accession to the EU could transform the political structures and interests 
that have up to now made it impossible to resolve the division of the 
island. More precisely, a large part of the future three-level organisation 
of government competences (EU, common state and constituent state) is EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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virtually prescribed in advance, given the requirements of EU accession, 
a presumption in favour of a largely decentralised assignment of 
competences to the constituent states, and the inevitable attribution of 
certain competences to the common state. This means that the area for 
possible contention between the two parties is much smaller than 
suggested by earlier confrontations of federal versus confederal models, 
and different conceptions of state sovereignty. The EU level would be 
supplying structures, guarantees and incentives that could hold together a 
bi-communal Cyprus, where otherwise centrifugal forces would be more 
likely to prevail. This view is not just theoretical speculation, since the 
‘Belgian laboratory’ has already demonstrated how essential features of a 
bi-communal state can fit into the legal and political structures of the EU.  
In addition, the other core elements for resolution of the conflict such as 
territory, refugees, property and security already saw considerable 
progress towards agreement in earlier negotiations. Moreover the EU 
itself has legal precedents that could accommodate some transitional 
derogations from standard EU law, where this would be vital to 
agreement between the two parties. 
If in Cyprus the political will to succeed is sustained, the available tool 
kit seems to make a solution eminently feasible.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
uch has been written on why and how the search for a solution 
to the Cyprus conflict got blocked for years and indeed 
decades.
1 Fortunately the situation has now changed. Since 
January 2002, negotiations have resumed between the two leaders, 
Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktas, with the participation of the UN 
special envoy, Alvaro de Soto. The leaders now speak of finding a 
solution by mid-2002, for a re-unified Cyprus to enter the European 
Union as a single member state as part of the forthcoming enlargement of 
the EU. A political decision by the EU to go ahead with the accession of 
Cyprus is expected at the end of 2002. Therefore the relevant task at hand 
is the working out of a solution to the island’s division that would be 
integrated with the preparations for EU accession.  
The long stalemate over Cyprus means that there is much ground to be 
made up in a short period of time. While  southern Cyprus is well 
advanced in its preparations for accession, northern Cyprus has not yet 
begun. The political context also has greatly changed over the last 
decade, notably since the UN Secretary General last proposed his detailed 
‘Set of Ideas’ for a solution in 1992 (see Annex C). Those ideas largely 
ignored the EU aspect, which was not at that time such a relevant factor 
for Cyprus. Today however the EU aspect greatly affects the design of 
the future constitution of a re-unified Cyprus. The importance of the EU’s 
competences should now dilute the problem of competition for powers 
between the national and sub-national levels of government. The EU 
offers the financial means for northern Cyprus to make rapid progress in 
modernising its economy, and can also work out special transitional 
arrangements. 
The assumption of this study is that a just and lasting settlement to the 
Cyprus conflict would deal directly with the basic needs and interests of 
the two communities. It would therefore ensure the re-unification of the 
island, respecting as much as possible principles of fairness and 
individual rights, essential to the Greek Cypriot community. It would also 
respect the political equality of the two constituent communities of 
Cyprus, and meet the essential Turkish Cypriot demands. A settlement 
would also meet the fundamental interests of other parties to the Cyprus 
conflict, including Greece, Turkey and the EU itself.  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Diez (2000), Dodd (1994), Emerson et al. (2001), Tocci 
(2000), Richmond (1998), Stivachtis (2000) and Trimikliniotis (2000).  
M INTRODUCTION 
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We try to avoid value-loaded language, especially where certain terms 
have already been abused in past political arguments between the two 
communities in Cyprus. We try to avoid reference to the Republic of 
Cyprus (RoC) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), 
given the political sensitivities in the use of these terms. When we find it 
unavoidable to use this terminology, we use it in a strictly neutral way; 
the RoC is used when referring to the internationally  recognised 
government of the south, and the TRNC refers to the government in the 
north of Cyprus recognised only by Turkey. We also do not use the 
language of federation or confederation, since the EU dimension means 
that the future Cyprus in practice will not conform to either model in any 
conventional sense of the terms. The EU itself is somewhat federal, 
somewhat confederal, and somewhat sui generis. The principal parties 
will of course choose their own language. We have to use some names in 
what follows, but do this for the strictly practical purpose of drafting the 
report and not for political reasons. We could imagine that the re-unified 
Cyprus might be termed a ‘common state’, and its two components 
‘constituent states’, and we use these terms in places.
2 We simply use 
‘Cyprus’ as the name for the future re-unified state. We call the two 
territorial entities ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ Cyprus respectively where 
convenient for drafting purposes. We use the terms ‘Greek’ and ‘Turkish’ 
to refer to the two communities of peoples, as distinct to territories. 
Today the territories and communities in Cyprus completely coincide, but 
this may gradually change over time with renewed openness and 
freedoms across the whole of the island.  
A Cyprus settlement could also benefit from downplaying abstract 
notions of sovereignty and statehood. Sovereignty could be said simply to 
lie in a new  constitution, which would determine the institutional 
structure and distribution of competences between the levels of 
government. The constitution would guarantee the maximum security and 
institutional protection to both communities in order to prevent the 
domination of one over the other. It might also avoid the establishment of 
legal hierarchy between levels of government. Statehood, citizenship and 
identity could come to be understood, as increasingly they are in the EU, 
in terms of multiple layers – European, national, regional, community etc. 
The Belgian case illustrates that there can be different answers to the 
question of legal precedence or hierarchy between the levels of 
government (common and constituent states), even in the EU where the 
European  law always has precedence and the member states are 
responsible for its implementation. (Belgium actually reconciles equality 
                                                 
2 The UN currently uses the terms ‘common state’ and ‘component states’. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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of rank between its federal and regional levels with the precedence of EU 
law - see section 2.3.4.) 
If in places this document seems to be more about Belgium than Cyprus, 
this is deliberate. The authors do not pretend to be saying what the 
precise solution  should be  – this can only be the responsibility of 
Cypriots. The idea is to make visible the instruments that are available in 
the tool kit. In particular there have been important developments in 
recent years not only in the EU system, but also in how these 
developments have interacted with reform of the Belgian state. While all 
cases of inter-ethnic tensions and conflict differ, the Belgian model for 
pacifying inter-ethnic tensions within the EU framework is by far the 
most relevant model for Cyprus to reflect on. Belgium is a small-to-
medium sized state with two main cultural communities, and it has 
restructured its political system (in fact during the period of Cyprus’ 
division) in several stages from being a centralised state to a largely 
decentralised one.  
If successfully concluded, the re-unification of Cyprus simultaneously 
with accession to the EU would be a remarkable political achievement. It 
could come to be another example of the European method of conflict 
resolution, following the recent case of Northern Ireland whose easing if 
not virtual settlement in recent years was facilitated by its inclusion in the 
EU framework,  and the gradual progress in transforming the multiple 
conflicts of the Balkans through Europeanisation of the whole region, as 
well as the earlier historic process of Europe’s post-second world war 
reconciliation.  It has to be said that in the case of Cyprus in the last 
decade the EU dimension was more ‘part of the problem’ than ‘part of the 
solution’, since the negotiation process for EU accession with only the 
south of the island deepened the divergence between the two 
communities and aggravated Greek-Turkish tensions. However the 
potential for the EU factor to be now ‘part of the solution’ is still 
important. If this solution were achieved within the course of 2002, in its 
fundamental political aspects if not yet of course in all details of 
implementation, Cyprus could come to be seen, in the words we heard 
from someone of the region, as ‘a new lighthouse of the East 
Mediterranean’. It might provide hope and inspiration for those only a 
few minutes flying time away from Cyprus, who are today still locked in 
the deepest and bitterest of ethno-nationalist conflicts.  
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CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONS 
ne may consider two approaches, both conceptually and in 
practice, for designing the institutional reconstruction of Cyprus 
after its several decades of division: 1) a ‘big bang’, whereby a 
new constitution is agreed and brought into force; or 2) at ‘step-by-step’ 
approach, with perhaps a sequence of important systemic reforms over a 
period of twenty years or so. Under the ‘big bang’ approach the intention 
would be to work out a more or less definitive system, or at least one that 
would last for many years. Under the ‘step-by-step’ approach the 
intention would be to give time for re-integration of the people and 
economy to progress and for trust between the communities to be re-
established, and to avoid trying to anticipate what the definitive 
constitutional system might look like. This choice of strategy would 
affect the nature of the transition arrangements. In the first case they 
would be essentially technical and short-run. In the second case the 
transition merges into a continuing process of systemic evolution, in 
which the ‘process’ is of essence. However a possible step-by-step 
approach to institutional questions should not entail postponing the 
settlement of any of the core elements of the conflict, such as territory, 
property and refugees. 
The UN’s ‘Set of Ideas’ of 1992 tended towards the first conception. 
However ten years have since elapsed, and it is natural to expect that the 
longer the period of separation u nder conditions of frozen conflict, the 
longer will be the period of subsequent reconciliation and re-integration. 
In what follows, we start with basically the first approach, discussing the 
institutions of the common and constituent states within the framework of 
the ‘Set of Ideas’. But then we introduce the EU dimension, which makes 
the whole question a three-tier game, rather than a two-tier game. We 
observe that in the particular case of Belgium the role of the institutions 
of the ‘common state’ is greatly affected by this EU dimension, in ways 
that may be pertinent for Cyprus. We end the chapter with the second 
approach, that of viewing the institutional issues as part of a long process, 
one that begins simply, and then builds up institutionally alongside the 
effective re-integration of the peoples and economy. The process may be 
a continuous one to the point of having no pre-determined final 
destination, as is true of both the EU itself and Belgium. To avoid 
excessive complication we do not try to sketch the whole process, but just 
suggest some of its elements.  
O EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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It should become apparent that, while the authors are not taking a position 
on the best model for Cyprus, we are pointing to a range of variables 
available for compromise positions within the spectrum ranging from a 
‘big bang’ solution through to a ‘minimal first step’ approach. We also 
find that to a substantial degree EU accession would pre-determine much 
of the systemic design of a future re-unified Cyprus. 
2.1  Institutions of the common state of Cyprus 
2.1.1  Institutional concepts 
The institutions of the common state of Cyprus would have to be crafted 
to bridge the apparently contradictory principles traditionally necessary 
for a settlement: on the one hand political equality between the two 
communities and the prevention of domination of one community over 
the other, and on the other hand effectiveness in decision-making and 
inter-communal reconciliation.  
Political scientists identify two approaches for achieving these objectives, 
which we shall call ‘power-sharing’ and ‘incentives for convergence’ (in 
preference to some academic terms that are less user-friendly).
3 Of these 
two main ideas, the first model (‘power-sharing’) provides guarantees for 
the representation of different community groups in institutions or 
electoral mechanisms, so as to protect numerical minorities from being 
consistently over-ruled or otherwise being exposed to unduly weak 
positions in power structures. The second model (‘incentives for 
convergence’) seeks to design institutions and electoral mechanisms that 
can induce political moderation by representatives of community groups 
towards each other. Rather than provide guarantees in the form of quotas 
in ‘power-sharing’, the ‘convergence’ approach conditions behaviour. 
The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and can be blended.  
Power sharing.
4 Such mechanisms can take many different forms in 
practice, including proportional representation in the electoral system, 
decentralisation of competences and mutual vetoes in order to ensure that 
the smaller community is not over-ridden by decisions taken by the larger 
one. However in a country such as Cyprus, proportional representation 
would not safeguard the smaller community’s security and adequate 
representation in public institutions.  
                                                 
3 ‘Power-sharing’ is used here to represent ideas called in the literature 
‘consociationalism’ and ‘explicitism’. ‘Convergence’ is here used for what some 
scholars call ‘centripetal strategies for reconciliation’. See following f ootnotes 
for references.  
4 See Lijphart (1977, 1968 and 1986). INSTITUTIONS 
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Another group of techniques involves explicit recognition of communal 
groups via reserved seats for representatives of different communities.
5 
Hence, in the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, a fixed 
percentage of seats may be reserved for the demographically smaller 
community. This percentage may be higher (although not necessarily 
reaching a numerical equality) than the number of seats that the smaller 
community would be able to secure through simple proportional 
representation.  In elections, there can be separate electoral rolls for 
different communities in order to ensure that the smaller community is 
able to elect its ‘own’ representatives. Through these mechanisms 
political equality between the communities can be secured at the common 
state level of government.  
However, these power-sharing mechanisms should not be expected to 
work in favour of inter-communal reconciliation and governmental 
effectiveness. A major criticism of these devices is that they replicate 
rather than abate inter-communal divisions. As a consequence these 
divisions may lead to deadlock in decision-making at the central level of 
government. This is indeed the criticism often made by the Greek Cypriot 
community of the 1960 constitutional arrangements. The 1960 
institutional arrangements, which provided for extensive power-sharing 
provisions, were criticised both for their unworkability and for their 
enhancement of inter-communal division. In deeply divided societies 
such as Cyprus, which also have demographically unbalanced 
communities, power-sharing mechanisms are essential to guarantee 
political equality and security for the smaller community. Yet exclusive 
reliance upon these principles may obstruct the breakdown of inter-
community barriers by entrenching segments and rigidly defining politics 
in divisive terms.  
Incentives for convergence.  Inter-communal reconciliation and 
effectiveness in government may be secured through the complementary 
use of convergence mechanisms. These would see the establishment of 
institutions and electoral mechanisms that encourage cooperation and 
discourage extremism and conflictual behaviour. Electoral laws can be 
used as mechanisms to encourage convergent behaviour.
6 The idea is to 
offer sufficient electoral incentives for campaigning politicians to appeal 
to voters from ‘other’ groups and thus display accommodative behaviour.  
One mechanism to attain convergent electoral results is  ‘alternative 
voting’, where the voter expresses a ranking of his choices. In a single-
                                                 
5 See Reilly and Reynolds (1999). 
6 See Horowitz (1985, 1990 and 1991). EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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member electoral district, if no candidate wins over 50% of ‘first 
preferences’ (which would normally come from the candidate’s ‘own’ 
community), lower order preferences (many from votes from the ‘other’ 
community) would be transferred or pooled until a majority winner has 
emerged. The elected representative would have thus appealed to 
communities other than his own. 
A second mechanism is  ‘cross-voting’,  which is a stronger way of 
achieving similar results. Under cross-voting the electoral system 
explicitly identifies the community of the candidate and the voter. In a bi-
communal polity, for example, the voter may have two votes, of which 
one must be cast in favour of a candidate of his own community, and the 
other for a candidate of the other community. This may become a hybrid 
system of the power-sharing and convergence incentive approaches, since 
the number of seats allocated to each community may be guaranteed, but 
the voice of the ‘other’ community can work in favour of moderate 
candidates appealing to both communities.
7 
In the case of Cyprus, where the two communities would be territorially 
concentrated (at least initially) and so constituencies would be ethnically 
homogenous, the alternative voting system would fail to produce the 
desired results. Candidates would need to do no more than secure the 
highest number of first preferences from their own group. Moreover, the 
numerical difference between the two communities would entail that 
convergence mechanisms would only be effective in the election of 
Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians. Both the alternative vote and the cross-
voting mechanisms would also suffer from insufficient democratic 
legitimacy. The elected parliamentarians under these systems may be the 
least unpopular (to the ‘other’ community), rather than the most popular 
(amongst their ‘own’ community). The cross-voting mechanism also 
raises a further problem of democratic legitimacy. Given the numerical 
imbalance between the two Cypriot communities, if each community 
were to have the same share of influence o n the election of 
parliamentarians from the ‘other community’, a Greek Cypriot vote 
would weigh less than a Turkish Cypriot vote.  
While the ‘power-sharing’ and ‘convergence incentive’ approaches are 
often presented as alternatives, they are by no means mutually exclusive. 
Power-sharing mechanisms guarantee  ex ante representation and 
decision-making power to the smaller community, whereas convergence 
mechanisms influence more precisely who is to be elected (i.e. politicians 
                                                 
7 For an exposition of cross-voting applied to the case of Cyprus, see Report No. 
38 (1995) of the ‘Friends of Cyprus’, a committee mainly composed of British 
parliamentarians (http://www.friendsofcyprus.org). INSTITUTIONS 
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appealing to the ‘other’ community as well). The legislature, executive 
and judiciary of the future common state of Cyprus could benefit from a 
blend of these different principles to fit the specific characteristics of the 
island.
8 Examples are suggested below.  
2.1.2   Legislature 
If various earlier UN proposals were followed, the Cyprus common state 
would have a bi-cameral legislature, although the alternative of having 
initially just one parliamentary body might be considered still, especially 
if the functions of the common state are initially relatively light.  
Following a power-sharing logic, each community would occupy a 
particular share of the seats. According to the ‘Set of Ideas’ the 
predetermined quotas would be 70:30 for the lower house, and 50:50 for 
the upper house.  
Reserved community seats in parliament are currently used in several 
countries, including Jordan (Christians and Circassians), India (for 
different tribes and castes), Pakistan (for non-Muslim minorities) as well 
as Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro. Most interesting perhaps is the case 
of Lebanon where, as in Cyprus under the 1960 Constitution, reserved 
seats for the different confessions have reflected a political deal rather 
than the demographic balance on the ground. Despite a Muslim majority 
of voters (57% of the total, of which 25% are Sunni, 25% Shi’ite, 6% 
Druze and 1% Alawite), seats between Christians and Muslims are shared 
equally (64 seats reserved for both Muslims and Christians). This 
equalisation took place in the aftermath of the civil war, before which 
reserved quotas had provided for a 6:5 ratio in favour of the Christian 
demographic minority.  
Alternatively there could be reserved seats for territorial representation: 
i.e. for northern and southern constituent state representatives. Naturally 
the outcome in practice would be identical to that yielded through 
guaranteed community representation so long as communities and 
territories overlapped in Cyprus. However, if and when the constituent 
states were to become ethnically non-homogenous, the political 
implications would be significantly different.  Territorial representation 
may be appealing in theory, in so far as it does not classify MPs explicitly 
according to ethnic/religious affiliation. Indeed territorial representation 
is used in Belgium in Flanders and Wallonia, rather than cultural 
representation. However, in the case of Cyprus where the demographic 
                                                 
8 For an assessment of the relative advantages of consociational vs. centripetal 
strategies of reconciliation, see Deschouwer and Jans (1996). EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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distribution is significantly more unbalanced, territorial representation 
would mean not only proportional representation of Turkish Cypriot 
MPs, but also reduced Turkish Cypriot incentives to allow Greek Cypriot 
citizens to settle in northern Cyprus.  
For the design of the electoral system, the Turkish Cypriots have tended 
to demand separate electoral rolls for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The 
Greek Cypriots have argued that separate rolls would discourage inter-
communal reconciliation and the emergence of a ‘Cypriot’ identity. They 
have been supporting instead a single list of the whole population, but 
with quota reservation of seats by community. In essence this would 
follow the electoral model adopted by Lebanon, where there are reserved 
seats for the various confessional groups, but all Lebanese voters are 
entitled to vote for any candidate in their constituency irrespective of 
their confession.
9 
However, unified lists might entail that the Turkish Cypriot 
parliamentarians would not be representative of their community, as they 
would have been elected predominantly by Greek Cypriot votes, given 
the demographic balance on the island. Unlike in Lebanon, where the 
numbers of voting Christians and Muslims are not far from equal (57:43), 
in Cyprus there would still be a predominant majority of Greek Cypriot 
voters (approximately 80%). A similar controversy exists in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where in the election  of the Croat member of the 
Presidency, ethnic Croat voters fear they could be outvoted by Muslim 
voters in the selection of a Croat candidate.  
Nonetheless, one could imagine that, while maintaining reserved seats 
and separate lists, MPs might be elected t hrough the support of the 
‘other’ community. This could be used for either or both of two systems 
of seats: a) separate community lists, or b) a mix of pan-Cyprus and 
separate community lists. If only separate lists were used, systems such 
as cross-voting could be considered. A mix of pan-Cyprus and separate 
lists instead would be like the future model for the European Parliament, 
where a limited number of MEPs will be elected through pan-European 
lists. In Cyprus a number of parliamentarians from each community (20% 
or 30% for example) would be elected from the entire population of the 
island, still following a 7:3 ratio. This alternative would be simpler and 
would avoid the problems of democratic legitimacy of the cross-voting 
system but may on the other h and lead to less convergent political 
behaviour compared with cross-voting.  
                                                 
9 For example in a constituency where there are four available seats, three 
reserved for Maronites and one reserved for a Shi’ite, the voter can choose a 
maximum of three Maronite candidates and one Sh’ite candidate. INSTITUTIONS 
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For the upper house an alternative system could be appointment by the 
constituent state governments. This would reflect the practice in 
Germany, where the Bundesrat is composed of members appointed by the 
governments of the Länder. (It was also the original practice of the 
United States of America, under Article I.3 of the 1783 Constitution, 
altered in 1913.) This would ensure that the governments of the two 
constituent entities were tied into the legislature of the common state in 
the closest possible way. In the United States this practice gradually 
changed to direct election, and the path could perhaps be left open for this 
development in Cyprus as well, once the inter-institutional arrangements 
have sufficiently settled down.  
A variant of this approach would be for the constituent state governments 
to appoint members of their own parliaments to serve as ‘double-hatted’ 
representatives.  
The principle of political equality between the two communities would 
favour the approval of all laws by both houses of parliament. In addition, 
power-sharing logic would suggest that, in the areas of greatest 
sensitivity, the voting rules could give a higher level of guarantee against 
one community being overridden. The ‘Set of Ideas’ advanced ideas 
along these lines, notably that separate majorities of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot representatives would be required in the lower house for foreign 
and security policy, federal budget and taxation, immigration and 
citizenship.  
The Greek Cypriot community did not approve of the idea of separate 
majorities, arguing that, during the 1960-63 years of the bi-communal 
Republic, the requirement of separate majorities led to deadlock in 
decision-making on key issues such as income taxation and 
municipalities. It is thus important to establish mechanisms for breaking 
out of deadlock in the event of blocked legislation in the future. On this 
matter, the ‘Set of Ideas’ proposed that in the event of deadlock in 
decision-making, the President of the House in which the ‘quorum’ is not 
reached during two consecutive meetings would call an extraordinary 
meeting. At this meeting a quorum would be reached if there was 50% 
support in the upper house and 30% support in the lower house. Hence, 
hypothetically if either the Greek or the Turkish Cypriot representatives 
were to block legislation in future in either house, the representatives 
from the other community from that house (i.e. all the 30 Turkish Cypriot 
MPs acting together in the case of a Greek Cypriot boycott in the lower 
house for example) could push the bill through. 
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2.1.3   Executive 
So far discussions concerning the executive of the future state of Cyprus 
have assumed a continuation of the 1960 presidential system.  The 
Executive of the common state of Cyprus would then be composed of a 
President, a Vice President and a Council of Ministers. Divergences 
between the two communities have revolved around questions such as 
whether the presidency should rotate, and if so what veto rights the 
President and Vice Presidents would have. 
During the current round of negotiations, the parties may also consider 
the establishment of a parliamentary system instead of a presidential one. 
This paper will not enter into a discussion of the merits of one system as 
opposed to the other, nor will it make specific recommendations about 
how the executive should be shaped. However, it should be noted that if 
the leaders were to opt for a presidential system, the importance of the 
legislature and its electoral system would be diluted. Hence, the need to 
institutionalise mechanisms to safeguard principles of political equality, 
inter-communal reconciliation and government effectiveness also in the 
executive. This again would call for an appropriate mix of power-sharing 
and convergence mechanisms in the executive as well as the legislature.  
For example, in a system in which the President and the Vice President 
would not come from the same community and would be elected by the 
two communities separately as suggested in past proposals, some 
electoral incentive for inter-group moderation may be called for. One 
could imagine that the legislature would nominate the presidential (and 
vice-presidential) candidates. In order to be nominated the candidate 
would have to gain the support of parliamentarians from both 
communities. Each Turkish Cypriot candidate would have received the 
support of a certain number of Greek Cypriot MPs from either house of 
parliament. The opposite would be true for Greek Cypriot c andidates. 
Hence, although there would be separate elections for the two 
communities, the nomination procedure would ensure that the candidates 
were not hostile to the community to which they did not belong.  
Regarding the Council of Ministers, the ‘Set of Ideas’ proposed that there 
would be ten members responsible for the major policy areas at the 
central level. In a common state of Cyprus within the European Union 
these would include foreign affairs, European affairs, economy and home 
affairs. Depending on the degree of shared competences between the two 
levels of government in Cyprus, there could also be common state 
ministries for transport, communications, energy and environment. The 
‘Set of Ideas’ proposed that the Ministers would be nominated by the 
President and Vice President on the basis of consensus. As in the 1960 INSTITUTIONS 
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Constitution and proposed in the ‘Set of Ideas’, community quotas would 
be also set in the Council of Ministers on a 7:3 ratio, with the Turkish 
Cypriot quota including control of at least one major ministry such as 
foreign, economy or home affairs, to which one would now add European 
affairs.  
Following again the power-sharing guidelines of the ‘Set of Ideas’, the 
President and the Vice President would draw up the Council agenda 
together and decisions would be taken in the Council by majority vote. 
However on questions relating to sensitive inter-communal matters such 
as foreign and European affairs, economy, citizenship and immigration, 
the President and Vice President would each retain  a last-resort veto 
power concerning both executive and legislative decisions.  
The Presidential/Vice Presidential veto powers are insisted upon by the 
Turkish Cypriot community, which given its position as a demographic 
minority is fearful of allowing key decisions at the common state level 
being taken against its interests. In response the Greek Cypriot 
community argues that an extensive right of veto would lead to deadlock 
in policy-making. Indeed these veto powers led to deadlock over 
questions such as the formation of a Cypriot army during the short-lived 
existence of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus in 1960-63.  
In order to safeguard inter-communal reconciliation and government 
effectiveness it is therefore of critical importance to develop and 
institutionalise dispute resolution mechanisms as part of the common 
state institutions and practices. One could imagine, that, in the event of a 
deadlock in decision-making due to the exercise of veto power by the 
President or the Vice President, the matter might be referred to an EU 
High Representative for Cyprus, who would naturally not come from a 
member state that was an interested party. The High Representative 
would engage with the conflicting parties in the attempt to find a 
consensual agreement. If conciliation proved impossible, the High 
Representative might even have final authority and arbitration rights over 
the matter causing deadlock in decision-making. 
2.1.4  Judiciary 
At the common state level the judiciary would include a Supreme Court 
entrusted w ith the task of interpreting the Constitution. The 1960 
Constitution also provided for a High Court. In a new common state of 
Cyprus a High Court would deal with cases affecting the common state 
areas of exclusive or shared competence. Alternatively, a single common 
state Court could both deal with constitutional issues and with common 
state laws. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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Box 1. The art of the Belgian compromise in enforcing European law 
It is recognised that the member state (Belgium) is always responsible to the 
EU for the implementation of European law. However some case law now 
illustrates how this can work in practice in situations in which there is no 
legal hierarchy between two levels of government within the Member State, 
as in Belgium where the federal and federated levels have equal rank. In 
principle there is a contradiction and a problem here, since the European law 
always takes precedence over national or sub-national law, and the Member 
State is responsible for its implementation. In a recent case the Flemish 
Parliament refused to respect EU competition policy rules for the contracting 
the renovation of its buildings. When the Belgian authorities drew this 
violation to the attention of the president of the Flemish Parliament, they 
received the reply that it was none of their business. The case was therefore 
referred to the European Court of Justice by the EU Commission, as a matter 
of EU Commission v. Belgium. However the Belgian authorities have made 
it clear that if a regional government is found guilty of violation of European 
law, they and not the Belgian state will have to pay the fine (by deduction by 
the federal ministry of finance from the share of tax revenues collected at the 
centre and redistributed to the regions). The Belgian state itself does not have 
to, and does not want to issue an injunction to its regional governments, 
given their equivalence of legal rank within Belgium. For the same reason 
the Belgian constitutional court or high court of justice will not be involved. 
Thus the solution is that the EU institutions (Commission and Court of 
Justice) effectively take on the burden of enforcing implementation at the 
sub-national level, even if the EU legal principle is that the member state is 
responsible. However in the extreme case that a region refuses to comply 
with the decision of the European Court of Justice, there is provision for the 
federal state to take over legal competence for the matter, known as the ‘right 
of substitution’. So far this right has never been exercised by the Belgian 
federal level.  
A proposal was made by twenty EU regions in September 2000 to secure the 
direct access of constitutional regions to the ECJ. The regions demand direct 
access to the Court both to defend themselves in the case of alleged non-
implementation of EU legislation or to challenge EU institutions if their 
competences are being impinged upon by the supra-national level.  
Source: De Schoutheete de Tervarent (1999). 
 
As in the 1960 Constitution and the ‘Set of Ideas’, there would be an 
equal number of Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges in the Supreme Court, 
with either a ‘neutral president’ (as provided for in the 1960 Constitution) 
or with a rotating Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot President (as 
suggested by the UN). However, in order to ensure the smooth 
functioning  of the common state judicial system, dispute-resolving INSTITUTIONS 
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mechanisms would also need to be introduced in the event of deadlock 
within the Court. These could take the form of a casting vote by a neutral 
judge from an EU member state that was not an interested party, or by a 
rotating president of the Court.  
A separate question is how contested issues of implementation of EU 
(EC) law would be handled. One orthodox position would be to follow 
the legal principle that the member state of the EU is responsible for 
implementation of EU (EC) law on its territory, and the High Court of the 
common state would have this function in Cyprus. However that is not 
the only way, as the Belgian model has shown – see Box 1. 
2.2   Institutions of constituent states of Cyprus 
This section follows the standard presumption of two constituent states. It 
may be mentioned that recently there has been aired in the media the idea 
of a third zone. While this seems highly unlikely to be retained by the 
negotiating parties, there some issues  arising here that merit some 
discussion. This is done separately in Box 2. 
2.2.1   Legislature 
Northern and southern Cyprus would have their own legislatures and 
would presumably be free to determine the electoral laws governing their 
constituent state elections. The constituent state parliaments would 
legislate on all policy areas apart from those assigned by the constitution 
to the common state level of government.  
2.2.2   Executive 
Northern and southern Cyprus would also have their separate 
governments, dealing with all policy areas that the constitution does not 
exclusively reserve to the common state. If Cyprus were to adopt a 
presidential system of governance, the president and vice president of the 
common state could also be the heads of government of northern and 
southern Cyprus respectively. The two constituent states, while enjoying 
identical powers, would be free to organise separate executive structures. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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Box 2. The third zone proposal 
On 4 March 2002, a Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Afrika, published a proposal 
for a third ‘bi-communal’ zone in Cyprus. While the anonymity of the Afrika 
proposals makes it impossible to make a correct reference to the source (of 
which the present authors have no knowledge), the ideas received attention 
in both northern and southern Cyprus, and therefore call for some comment. 
The article suggested a constitutional structure with three regions and two 
communities. The third (bi-communal) region would be governed by the 
federal authorities and would comprise 24% of the island’s territory (the ratio 
of territory of southern and northern Cyprus would then be 52% and 24%, 
respectively). A third bi-communal zone may appear an attractive 
proposition in so far as it would create a certain area in which the 
communities could start living together again. It also bears some comparison 
with the Belgian model (three regions, the third being bilingual Brussels, and 
two communities). 
Upon closer examination, however, the idea would create fresh difficulties 
for the negotiating process in Cyprus. First it would complicate discussions 
on territorial readjustment and refugee return. From which area would the 
third zone come? Turkish Cypriots could feel that the third zone might create 
a backdoor route for a greater reduction of territory under their control. 
Greek Cypriots might feel that most of the land destined to the third zone 
could otherwise be transferred to Greek Cypriot administration. The third 
zone would also complicate the issue of refugee return. Finally, the third 
zone would create new uncertainties over the political balance between the 
two communities in the third zone.  
However, an alternative idea, which would present fewer complications for 
the negotiations on territory, refugees or institutions, but might achieve 
similar b i-communal results on a smaller scale, would be to create bi-
communal joint councils for local government services for cities such as 
Nicosia and Famagusta-Vorosha. Such joint city administrations would deal 
with local government services that were territorial in nature. Community 
services (education, culture, religion, etc.) would instead remain under the 
control of constituent state authorities. This could be analogous to features of 
bilingual Brussels.  
 2.2.3   Judiciary 
Following the partition of the island, the Turkish Federated State of 
Cyprus (1975-83) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (1983-
present) retained the same criminal and civil codes inherited from British 
colonial rule. The same is true for the Republic of Cyprus. Although 
these legal codes have not fundamentally changed, over the course of INSTITUTIONS 
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decades both sides have amended them. In the case of the TRNC, new 
laws or amendments have not systematically followed the Turkish model 
(or any other) nor have the amendments been very substantial.  
The current status of the two legal codes, with their limited differences, 
would probably be accepted as the starting point within a re-unified 
island. There would therefore be independent judiciaries in northern and 
southern Cyprus, responsible for the areas of competence of the two 
constituent states. The US federal system is a reminder of the feasibility 
of enduring differences in state legal systems, and independence of their 
judiciaries for matters of state law. Even in the case of the United 
Kingdom, Scotland has retained a largely autonomous legal system. It 
might later be agreed to aim for legal harmonisation and possible re-
unification. This would also occur within the EU context of 
harmonisation in particular policy fields.  
The death penalty in the TRNC has been revoked for almost all crimes 
and it is effectively never used. But it has not yet been totally abolished 
and this would no doubt be a requirement for the EU. It seems unlikely 
that there would be significant resistance to this in northern Cyprus.  
2.3   The representation of Cyprus in EU institutions   
2.3.1   European Parliament  
Under the Treaty of Nice, Cyprus is entitled to six members of the 
European Parliament. Following the same power-sharing provisions as 
for the lower house of the common state parliament, one could imagine 
that four MEPs would be elected by and from the Greek Cypriot 
community, and two by and from the Turkish Cypriot community. The 
method of election might well be the same as that for the lower house of 
parliament of the common state. 
2.3.2   European Commission 
Under the Treaty of Nice each member state would be entitled to one 
Commissioner up until the Union reaches 25 members. Given that 
Cyprus would be included in the first wave of accessions in 2004, it 
would  be entitled to one Commissioner per term up until the next 
expansion of the EU. One could thus imagine that there would be a 
system of rotation between a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot Commissioner, 
analogous to Belgian practice.  
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2.3.3   The Council of Ministers and Article 146  
There is a seemingly banal piece of legal drafting in the Treaty 
establishing the European Union that would, however, be of considerable 
interest to Cyprus. Article 146 reads: 
The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member 
State at ministerial level, authorised to commit the government 
of that Member State. 
While this wording may appear prosaic, its significance is that it replaced 
a former legal ruling that only ministers or state secretaries of national 
governments could represent the member state in the EU Councils. The 
change in the new text was negotiated in 1991 at the insistence of two of 
the EU’s federalised states, Belgium and Germany, in order to permit 
their governments to be represented on occasions by ministers from sub-
national governments. These demands had resulted from the increasing 
tendency of the EU to legislate in domains of policy that are mostly or 
exclusively sub-national government competences in the member states 
that have multi-tier structures. This can also be viewed as an example of 
the ‘post-modern’ Europe, where the nation state has relinquished certain 
responsibilities to the two-way movement of Europeanisation and 
regionalisation, or a sign of the emerging ‘Europe of the regions’. 
When Belgium and Germany pressed for this provision, the response of 
other member states was in the end to acquiesce, but on condition that 
there could be only one representative who could speak and vote in the 
Council, and that he or she had to be authorised to speak for the member 
state as a whole. The Article 146 mechanism has in practice become more 
interesting for Belgium than for Germany, both because of the greater 
degree of decentralisation in Belgium and because Belgian has essentially 
only two large sub-national entities, whereas Germany has 17 Länder. 
This means that the task of representation and coordination is much more 
interesting and manageable for Belgium than it is for Germany.  
With the launch of the Convention on the Future of Europe in March 
2002, there are already further developments in line for debate that would 
imply carrying the distinct representation of sub-national entities a step 
further. Six sub-national entities (Flanders and Wallonia, Bavaria and 
Nord-Rhein Westphalia, Catalonia and Scotland) have joined forces to 
propose that the qualified majority votes of their member states (Belgium, 
Germany, Spain and the UK) be split to give them a separate vote. The 
model might, extending the provisions of Article 146, still call for only 
one voice from the member state to speak at the Council, but allow the 
votes cast to be split. While unlikely to be accepted at this stage, and sure INSTITUTIONS 
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to encounter serious opposition, the proposal is nonetheless an interesting 
idea in the direction of deepening the ‘Europe of the regions’ concept.  
In the case of Cyprus, the idea of split votes could have important 
advantages and disadvantages to both communities. Splitting votes would 
allow the Greek Cypriot community to have full control over their share 
of the Cyprus vote, which would presumably be larger than that of the 
Turkish Cypriots; i.e., the Greek Cypriot share of the Cyprus vote would 
not be subject to Turkish Cypriot consent. It would however reduce the 
need for internal coordination of policies. The Turkish Cypriot 
community would instead be able to act in an even more decentralised 
manner but would be less likely to retain ‘veto’ rights on the larger share 
of the vote to be cast by Cyprus in the Council.  
2.3.4  Coordination over EU policy-making – Belgian style 
For all EU member states the organisation of internal coordination 
between government departments for the purposes of negotiating in 
Brussels has become a major feature of government structure, involving 
nowadays almost every government department.  Negotiations over 
accession have given the representatives of the Republic of Cyprus a 
foretaste of this. Unfortunately government in northern Cyprus has not 
yet any such experience. It is indeed urgent that comprehensive 
discussions be opened up between t he Commission and officials in 
northern Cyprus so that the necessary familiarisation is begun for 
virtually all of the upper ranks of public administration. 
For Cyprus, as for the existing member states with multi-tier government 
structures, this coordination will have the extra dimension of coordination 
between the national and sub-national levels of governments, and 
between the two sub-national governments. This should actually become 
a major part of the process whereby the two communities of Cyprus start 
getting to know each other again, and re-learn how to work together with 
the obligation of constant cooperation. While Cyprus will of course work 
out its own arrangements, it is worth noting the experience of one 
member state that has developed a mechanism, and indeed culture, in its 
public administration for doing this.  
Belgium is the case in point, which is much more relevant than the other 
multi-tier governments in the EU. (Germany, Spain and Italy have large 
numbers of sub-national entities, and they  do not have bi-ethnic social 
structures). Without wishing therefore to advocate the Belgian model at 
all precisely, it may be studied as an extreme observation of a member 
state that has sought a) to go as far as possible in the direction of 
regionalisation without undermining the sound functioning of a common EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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state, and b) to endow the national and sub-national governments with 
equality of legal status.
10 From the perspective of Cyprus, these two 
motivations of the Belgian model are highly interesting.  
Table 1. Multi-tier governance in a bi-ethnic EU member state, Belgian 
model 
1.    EU level 
2.    National EU member state level 
3A. Sub-national territorial entities (regions, etc.) 
3B. Sub-national communities (language groups) 
4.    Municipalities 
Table 2. Belgian model for representation in EU Councils – Principles 
Type  Division of competences  Leader  Assisted by 
I  Exclusively federal   Federal  None 
II  Mainly federal, partly sub-
national 
Federal  Region or 
community 
III  Mainly sub-national, partly 
federal 
Region or 
community 
Federal 
IV  Exclusively sub-national  Region or 
community 
None 
Source: Kerremans (2000). 
                                                 
10 A control for how different outcomes may emerge from similar structures, 
depending upon political behaviours, is provided in an interesting comparison by 
a Belgian political scientist (Jans, 2001) of the Belgian and Canadian 
experiences. Canada is perhaps the other most interesting comparison, involving 
a bi-ethnic state with long-standing inter-ethnic tensions and separatist 
arguments. The key conclusions from this comparison are worth an extensive 
quotation: ‘… both Canada and Belgium experienced a substantial share of 
ethno-national rivalry and a corresponding number of efforts to regulate these 
tensions. However, their respective records of success are entirely different. 
Except [in one case] all of the Belgian conflicts were transformed into mutually 
accepted outcomes. The list of Belgian conflicts is actually a long list of complex 
packaged deals and compromises. Compromises that were consistently translated 
into concrete policy measures and reforms. Except [for one case] none of the 
important Canadian ethno-nationalist conflicts resulted in a mutually accepted 
outcome. Those rare instances where Canadian elites seemed close to a policy 
outcome that satisfied both English and French Canadians, the implementation of 
the agreement proved to be an insurmountable stumbling block [example]. The 
continuous stream of compromises in Belgium led to a gradual, but very 
fundamental reform of the Belgian state. Thirty years of constitutional 
negotiations in Canada did not lead to a single reform supported by the two 
language groups. If anything, forty years of reform efforts seem to have brought, 
the prospects of Quebec’s separation form Canada closer than ever before’. INSTITUTIONS 
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Since Article 146 of the EU Treaty permits only one person to represent 
Belgium in the EU Council (with the right to speak and vote), and given 
the large decentralisation of competences and the legal equality of the 
national and sub-national levels of government, elaborate rules have been 
developed on who should represent Belgium depending on the agenda of 
the Council. The decision on whether the leader of the Belgian delegation 
should be from the federal or sub-national government depends on which 
level of government has the main competence for the sector of policy of 
the particular formation of the Council in question. For this purpose four 
categories have been established, as set out in Tables 2 and 3.  
Table 3. Belgian model for representation in EU Councils - Practice  
Type  Division of 
competences 
Sector-specific Councils  Representation 
I  Exclusively 
federal 
Foreign policy, 
Macroeconomic policy, 
Budget (of EU),  
Development aid 
Telecommunications 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Federal 
II  Mainly federal, 
partly sub-
national 
Internal market 
Public health 
Energy 
Transport 
Environment* 
Agriculture** 
Federal minister, 
assisted by one 
(rotating) sub-
national 
representative 
III  Mainly sub-
national, partly 
federal 
Industry 
Research 
 
One (rotating) sub-
national 
representative, 
assisted by a federal 
representative 
IV  Exclusively sub-
national 
Culture 
Education 
Tourism 
Land use planning 
Fisheries*** 
One (rotating) sub-
national 
representative 
* It is being discussed whether to move environment down to Type III. 
** Agriculture is a special case. In the absence of a federal ministry of agriculture, a 
deputy minister of foreign affairs represents Belgium in the Council, supported by two 
assessors from Flanders and Wallonia without rotation. 
*** Fisheries is also a special case. Since only Flanders has a coastline, there is no 
rotation with Wallonia, and Flanders therefore always represents Belgium in the EU 
Fisheries Council.  
Source: Kerremans and Beyers (2000). EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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Two categories identify the exclusive competences of federal and sub-
national governments, respectively, in which case only that level of 
government is represented. The two other categories concern shared 
competences. One case is where the federal government is deemed to 
have the main interest and expertise and the sub-national government a 
lesser involvement, and the other case is vice versa. Where the regions or 
communities are entitled to participate, only one of them will attend the 
Council meetings. This is determined by half-yearly rotation, coinciding 
with the rotation of the EU presidency. 
Belgium has also an elaborate system for prior coordination between the 
various levels of government on the position to be adopted in the 
negotiations in the Council. When the European Commission issues a 
proposal, it is sent to the Belgian Permanent Representative to the EU, 
who sends it to the federal and each of the regional governments. Each of 
these governments defines its position and expresses it at weekly 
meetings of the Directorate for EU Affairs (known as the P.11 
Committee) convened at and chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
These meetings determine the position to be taken by Belgium in the EU 
Council of Ministers, and instructions are given to whoever will represent 
Belgium there. There has to be unanimity on the part of the federal and 
regional/community governments, since there exists no legal hierarchy 
between the levels of government – the regional governments have equal 
status to the federal government.
11 
If agreement is not possible, the issue is referred to the foreign ministers 
of the federal and regional governments. If they fail to agree the issue is 
passed to the top level: the Concertation Committee of the Prime Minister 
of Belgium and the Ministers-Presidents of the sub-national entities. If 
there is still a failure to reach agreement, then Belgium will abstain from 
participating in the negotiations, and also abstain if a vote is taken. 
However abstention is rare (only four times since 1994). This may be 
partly explained by the political culture of negotiation in Belgium and the 
Belgians’ desire to be viewed as ‘good Europeans’ by other member 
states. But it is also because of the strong incentives not to abstain in the 
Council. Depending on what voting rule applies in the Council, an 
abstention could work against the interests of one level of government in 
Belgium. If the Council operates according to unanimity, an abstention 
would count as a positive vote. The level of government resisting a 
positive vote would thus have strong incentives not to abstain but to try 
and formulate a Belgian position taking at least partly into account its 
                                                 
11 This account of the Belgian system draws heavily on Keeremans (2000).  INSTITUTIONS 
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concerns. If instead the Council operates on the basis of qualified 
majority voting, an abstention would count as a negative vote. In this case 
the level of government in Belgium supporting the EU initiative would 
attempt to prevent a Belgian abstention.  
There is also a system of sector-specific coordination committees 
between the several levels of government, used wherever the technicality 
of business is too great to be handled by the general P.11 Committee. 
With the Belgian position and its representation in the Council 
determined, there is then a division of labour between the leader of the 
Belgian delegation and an assessor, both of whom come from different 
levels of government (and also rotate on a six-monthly basis). The 
assessor has the task of keeping in contact with the governments not 
present as negotiations proceed, thus arranging ‘live coordination’ by 
phone from the Council chamber. 
Some of the extreme complexity and cost of the Belgian system would 
surely be inappropriate for Cyprus. There will be in any case the need to 
avoid costly duplication of government ministries and national and sub-
national level.
12 When the re-unification of Cyprus becomes operational, 
there will be the practical question of what happens to the RoC’s 
departments in Nicosia that were initially serving the whole of Cyprus 
and subsequently only the south. As and when a single common state and 
two constituent states take shape, a rational system of government 
departments will have to be worked out in Nicosia. In this connection it is 
worth noting another example of the Belgian system, reported in the next 
chapter: Belgium no longer has a federal minister of agriculture, or 
therefore a ministry of agriculture. As the policy competence for 
agriculture, apart from its EU content, was largely transferred to the 
regions, there remains at the federal level no more than an agriculture 
section in the foreign ministry.  
However these coordination arrangements should not only be viewed as 
cost-increasing factors. The institutional system of a new Cyprus state 
would be designed to settle  and resolve one of the most intractable 
contemporary conflicts, whose cost in terms of human suffering and 
foregone economic development has been huge.  
                                                 
12 Belgrade also has a problem of this kind to work out in connection with 
settling the status of Montenegro. At present there is a gross duplication of 
ministries  of the Yugoslav and Serbian governments, which is not yet 
rationalised, pending a decision on whether Montenegro remains in the Yugoslav 
Federation or not.  EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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2.3.5   Other EU institutions 
Within the Committee of the Regions there would clearly be separate 
representation of the two constituent states. The Committee of the 
Regions (CoR) was created by the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 with a view 
to giving greater effect to the principle of subsidiarity within the Union. 
The CoR acts as an advisory body that must be consulted on all matters 
relevant to European regions. The areas of compulsory consultation 
include: economic and social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure 
networks, health, education, culture, employment policy, social policy, 
environment, transport and vocational training. The Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers must first consult the 
CoR over the draft legislation or action programme in the above-
mentioned areas of competence. The CoR also has the right to issue its 
own opinions, but its recommendations are not binding. The members of 
the CoR are appointed every four years based on proposals from the 
member states. Since the Treaty of Nice, the members of the CoR must 
be regionally elected representatives. Cyprus is entitled to six seats in the 
CoR of which there would either be an equal allocation of seats between 
the two constituent states (3:3), or a greater number of seats for the larger 
southern constituent states (4:2).  
The importance of the CoR should not be exaggerated given the non-
binding nature of its opinions. Nonetheless, it should be noted that while 
in theory each EU region has the same de jure representation, in practice 
it is those regions from member states with the most decentralised 
structures (such as Belgium or Germany), that have acted as the motors of 
the institution. In fact, in September 2000, a declaration was signed by 
twenty constitutional regions of Europe, demanding greater legislative 
powers to be given to the Committee. These regions will raise this 
question during the Convention on the Future of Europe. The constituent 
states of Cyprus could thus also play a significant role in the policies of 
this evolving EU institution.  
Cyprus would also be entitled to six seats in the Economic and Social 
Committee. As in the case of the CoR, seats could be divided either 
equally between Greek and Turkish Cypriots or according to a 2:1 ratio.   
Cyprus would have one judge at the European Court of Justice, and one 
judge at the Court of First Instance, making it possible to rotate the senior 
and junior positions between representatives of the two Cyprus 
communities. 
 
 INSTITUTIONS 
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2.4   Transition and systemic evolution 
The above discussion of institutional questions have so far largely 
followed the outline proposed in the UN’s ‘Set of Ideas’ of 1992, adding 
the EU dimension. The UN proposals also contain provisions for the 
transition from the status quo to the new system. However, especially 
with the passing of another decade of total separation, there may be two 
quite different concepts of transition. One would indeed concern the short 
run, and be essentially technical. The other would be medium to long run, 
and really concern the process of systemic evolution, or restructuring the 
system in stages on the basis of the experience of gradually restoring 
links and re-building trust. 
2.4.1   Transitional arrangements 
The ‘Set of Ideas’ proposed strictly technical and short-term measures, 
which would be fully implemented within an 18-month period. Including 
now the EU dimension, this time horizon would also be highly relevant, 
covering the period between signature of the Treaty of Accession and 
actual accession (say from early 2003 through to 2004). For example the 
arrangements would cover the temporary continuation of present laws 
and regulations until they are taken over or amended in the competences 
of the common state or the EU. The northern constituent state would 
operate under the laws of the TRNC in its fields of competence so long as 
these laws do not contravene Cyprus’ Treaty of Accession. There would 
be pre-accession technical assistance for catching up with the EU acquis 
in northern Cyprus, etc.  
However the list of topics requiring transition now seems to be much 
longer and bigger than the ‘Set of Ideas’ suggested, both b ecause of the 
EU aspect and the extra decade of separation. These numerous topics 
may be considered under three major headings:  
A. Transition with respect to the settlement of the conflict 
•  Movement of people upon adjustments to the map 
•  Compensation payments for loss of property 
•  Progressive demilitarisation 
•  Duration and shape of peacekeeping forces 
•  Legal issue over the ‘successor state’ 
B. Transition with respect to the terms of EU accession 
•  Restrictions on freedom of acquisition of property 
•  Technical transitional arrangements for northern Cyprus to catch up 
on the acquis EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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•  Introduction of the euro, e.g. after two years 
•  Schengen visa provisions for non-resident Turks 
C. Transition with respect to the re-integration of the peoples and 
economy of Cyprus 
•  Re-unification of civil and criminal codes of law 
•  Renewed harmonisation and integration of tax system 
•  Re-integration of the social security system 
•  Introduction of convergence methods in elections 
•  Building of new common institutions (e.g. with sufficient bi- or 
multi-lingual civil servants from both communities) 
•  Creation of bi-communal city or local government areas (e.g. for 
Nicosia) 
•  Provision for schooling for Greeks and Turks living in the ‘other’ 
constituent state 
•  Qualitative improvement of trust and personal links across the 
communities 
This list is so long and substantial that it returns to the question of the 
strategy for systemic evolution as outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter, and namely the choice of the best way in the range between the 
‘big bang’ and ‘step-by-step’ approaches. 
As regards the ‘successor state’ question there are issues of political 
sensitivity as well as legal substance. In general the issue is how to make 
the new Cyprus out of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). At the political level there is the 
obvious asymmetry between the two on the matter of international 
recognition, but also the equally obvious demand by the Turkish Cypriots 
to be entering into the new Cyprus as equal partners. On legal content 
there is the question how to handle the stock of laws and assets that might 
be transferred to the new Cyprus. On matters of form one idea might be 
that, when all matters of substance are agreed in a single text, this would 
be signed by the two leaders, implying equality of the two parties to the 
agreement; however this act would also proceed to dissolve both the RoC 
and the TRNC in favour of the new Cyprus. On matters of substance 
there would no doubt have to be a detailed process of sifting through the 
laws and assets of the RoC and TRNC for the purpose of transferring 
them or not to the successor state. Political sensitivities in the handling of 
this matter may turn out to be more acute than the substance. The issue 
should surely not be allowed to become a roadblock impeding progress 
on working out substantive solutions. If after thorough discussion the 
question of legal -political form cannot be resolved by the two parties, the 
UN special representative might be invited to make a proposal.  INSTITUTIONS 
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2.4.2   Systemic evolution 
It would probably be agreed by everyone that any solution will have be a 
compromise between the extreme ‘big bang’ and the ‘step-by-step’ 
positions. The issue would be how far the first step would have to go, or 
how far would there need to be agreement on permanent features of the 
system.  
There are three considerations to be weighed in this context.  
First is the need for an adequate exit from conflict model, given that trust 
and functional links and re-integration will have to be built up over a 
period of many years; as this develops, the suitable design of the common 
state can evolve. The example of South Africa’s ‘exit from Apartheid’ 
may be recalled, this having proceeded is several stages. There have been 
several other inter-community conflicts closer to Cyprus, where the EU 
and/or international community have been searching for solutions over 
the last decade (currently Serbia and Montenegro,
13 Georgia and 
Abkhazia,
14 and Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh
15). In all these cases, 
international negotiations under UN, OSCE or EU auspices have been 
revolving around how to maximise autonomy of the entities within the 
constraint of avoiding outright independence or irredentist secession. 
While some of these negotiations are still far from finding solutions, that 
which is closest is the Serbia-Montenegro case. While this is the easiest 
in the sense that there has not been outright conflict, it is also significant 
that this is the only one in which the goal of EU accession (in the long-
run) is  part of the political equation. Bringing the EU level of policy 
competence into the equation may allow the  minimal initial level of 
viable ‘common state’ competence to be less than in the absence of the 
EU factor. This argument is of course much stronger and more immediate 
for Cyprus than for Serbia and Montenegro.
16 
Secondly, the EU itself is proceeding to its finalité step by step, with 
institutional reforms taking place with successive treaty amendments over 
decades. Various theoretical models (federal and other) have been 
discussed as ideas for the future, but it took decades of integration and 
                                                 
13 Whyte (2001).  
14 Coppieters (2000). 
15 Emerson et al. (2000). 
16 An outline agreement over a new Union of Serbia and Montenegro was 
reached in March 2002 with the mediation of Javier Solana, which if ratified and 
worked out in detail would be an example of a thin and decentralised Union 
structure, fashioned with a view to EU integration. The text is available in the 
March 2002 number of the CEPS South-East Europe Monitor (www.ceps.be). EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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confidence-building before the EU could even begin to discuss seriously 
questions of its finalité or a constitution. Even now, with the Convention 
that has just started, the end of the EU’s ‘transition’ from a long period of 
institutional evolution to an act of constitution is not yet in sight.  
Thirdly, there is again the case of Belgium, which has transformed itself 
from a centralised state to a highly decentralised federation with four 
constitutional reforms over 25 years. Even today this process may not 
have ended. Taking the EU and Belgium together, the model is not of 
‘adoption’ of a new constitution, but one of continuous constitutional 
evolution. Political leaders are finding not only that they cannot anticipate 
the definitive system in the manner of the founding fathers of the US 
constitution; in addition they are leaving open the question whether there 
will ever be such a thing as a definitive constitution. The British example 
of not formally fixing the constitution at all may be considered extreme to 
the point of idiosyncrasy, but in a way the same point is being made.  
How might such considerations relate in practice to the case of Cyprus? 
One idea could be to note again a feature of the Belgian model, and in 
particular its coordination structure for determining its position on 
matters of EU policy (as describe in the preceding section). One may 
have in mind the striking example of the domain of agricultural policy, 
which has a large EU competence, but for which Belgium has entirely 
regionalised its sub-EU competence, abolishing its federal ministry of 
agriculture and the post of minister of agriculture. The function of the 
Belgian ‘common state’ consists here of coordination of the policy 
preferences of the two communities, with the aid of a small secretariat for 
agriculture in the ministry of foreign affairs. As a more general system 
one could think of a wider application of this method to a set of policy 
domains, which could get the new Cyprus started for a transitional 
period. The effective deadline for an agreement in the autumn/winter of 
2002 (in order for an Accession Treaty to be signed with the reunified 
island) supports the view that a first step would entail a thinly 
institutionalised centre with limited policy competences.  
On the other hand, while as a theoretical model one can extrapolate the 
coordination system to the point of being the essence of the system, there 
would in practice remain the vital question of the minimum content of 
‘common state’ competences and institutions (executive, legislature and 
judiciary) that would be necessary for a viable system: the sufficient glue 
to hold the system together. A first-step constitutional structure should be 
strong enough to prevent the dissolution of the system. However, as 
pointed out above, the workings of the EU would itself be part of the 
glue.  INSTITUTIONS 
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In addition to a first constitutional structure, a first-step agreement would 
also need to settle the other issues of the conflict (territory, refugees and 
security). A step-by-step approach should not be an attempt to postpone 
the resolution of conflictual questions, running the risk that a settlement 
might collapse after accession to the EU. It would only  be the precise 
arrangements of the constitution which could evolve over time. Greater 
institutionalisation of the centre and a shift of competences from the 
constituent to the common state level may be determined over time with 
the consent of the two communities. 
Whether this transition period would run for a short or long length of 
time would be another important question. This could be decided in the 
light of experience. It would also take into account the real evolution of 
economic re-integration and the gradual rebuilding of trust between the 
two communities.  
In the event of considerable reliance on a coordination structure to get 
started, there would also be the question of the extent of commitment to a 
next step in the process of institutional evolution. At a minimum, there 
would need to be agreement to revisit the institutional questions after a 
certain number of years. The maximum would entail pre-commitment to 
the nature of the next step. An intermediary position would be to agree to 
a rendez-vous clause for revisiting the issues after N years, but with the 
proviso that it would consider options for integrating the system further 
and explicitly ruling out secession.  
In conclusion, it is evident that there would be many domains subject to 
substantial  transitional processes. At some point, however, the nature of 
the strategy changes. In one model the parties decide basically on a 
definitive system, and then work out how to get from here to there. In a 
second model the parties decide to get started with something practical 
and not too ambitious, knowing that the subsequent process of continuing 
institutional evolution would be of the essence. Embarking on ‘a common 
journey to an unknown destination’ may sound risky, but that is actually 
what the EU itself is doing.  
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CHAPTER 3 
KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
his German expression, whose meaning will be self-evident, is 
used because it becomes the effective name of part of the current 
EU Convention process. The questions posed in the terms of 
reference for the Convention include:  
Can we make a clear distinction between three types of 
competence: the exclusive competence of the Union, the 
competence of the member States, and the shared competence 
of the Union and the Member States? At what level is 
competence exercised i n the most efficient way? How is the 
principle of subsidiarity applied here? 
Of high relevance to Cyprus, these questions over competences have been 
most forcefully raised by member states with multi-tier governmental 
structures (for example Germany) under pressure from their sub-national 
entities wishing to prevent an erosion of their own competences. At a 
time when Cyprus will be working out its new distribution of 
competences in a re-unified setting, the EU will itself be addressing the 
same questions. 
Moreover, as the previous section has pointed out, where the EU shares 
competences with its member states it is often doing so not just with 
central governments, but also with sub-national entities. By contrast one 
can sometimes hear in the Cyprus debate remarks like ‘all domains of EU 
policy will evidently be competences of the central government’. This 
does not correspond to current realities in EU member states with multi-
tier governments, nor is it a sound prescription for the future. The future 
Kompetenz Katalog for the re-unified Cyprus as member state of EU will 
need therefore to be worked out in considerable detail. Options will 
remain open on many points for the two communities of Cyprus to work 
out between themselves, but these choices will nonetheless be 
considerably constrained in the EU setting. In this chapter an attempt is 
made to sketch both the options and the constraints. 
3.1   Monetary policy 
Cyprus may be expected to join the eurozone two years after accession to 
the EU. The Central Bank of Cyprus would become part of the European 
System of Central Banks. Its governor would become a member of the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank. Monetary policy at the 
macroeconomic level – control of interest rates and money supply – is set 
T KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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in its fundamental aspects identically for the whole of the euro area ‘in 
Frankfurt’.  
While monetary policy remains a national competence within all EU 
member states, there is an array of federal central bank structures that 
may be adopted within a member state. The US Federal Reserve System 
is usually thought of as a model to be compared with the eurozone as a 
whole. However Germany has so far retained the federal structure of the 
Bundesbank as a second tier now within the federalist euro system. The 
reforms of the internal structure of the Bundesbank discussed currently in 
Germany will surely rationalise and adapt the Bundesbank system, but 
nobody doubts that its federal structure will remain. For Cyprus one 
could thus consider schemes for regional representation in a governing 
council of the Central Bank of Cyprus.  The only condition sine qua non 
would be that the governor cannot take any instructions while sitting on 
the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, and must be able to 
speak freely for his central bank. 
In Germany the  Landeszentralbanken (the regional offices of the 
Bundesbank) have always had a role in the implementation of banking 
supervision for smaller, regional banks, because of their in-depth 
knowledge of the business of these institutions. While the rules for 
banking supervision are set at the EU (and often global) level, the basic 
principle remains that of host country supervision. Involving regional 
institutions in the supervision of banks that operate predominantly at the 
regional level makes sense, provided of course that the highest standards 
of professional quality of banking supervision can be maintained. This 
requires an extremely high degree of integrity of the regional institutions, 
whose first instinct might often be to cover up mistakes of regional 
banking or savings institutions. 
Within the EU, however, there has been a wide range of practice for the 
supervisory and regulatory functions, ranging from the independent 
regulator, to the ministry of finance, to the central bank.
17 The advent of 
the euro has had the result of inducing some convergence on the central 
bank model. This is because the national central banks no longer have the 
‘moral hazard’ problem of combining both monetary and regulatory 
policy responsibilities under the same roof. Also the national central 
banks of the euro area now find themselves with spare staff resources.  
It may be discussed whether it would be economically optimal for the 
euro to be introduced at the same time in the whole of Cyprus, given the 
lower level of economic development in northern Cyprus. An alternative 
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scenario might be for northern Cyprus to retain for some years a separate 
weaker currency, notably the Turkish lira as at present. The experience of 
East Germany’s immediate integration into the DM area upon re-
unification may be borne in mind. Many economists have argued that the 
key mistake Germany made was that of instantly equalising wage levels 
between West and East Germany.
18 This occurred under the pressure of 
fears of a massive exodus from east to west, which might have seriously 
disrupted the German labour market. In the case of Cyprus, however, a 
large flow of migration of the kind feared in Germany is highly unlikely 
because of inter-community tensions, which will take time to abate. For 
these reasons a replica of the German re-unification experience may be 
considered both avoidable as well as undesirable.   
In shaping a suitable policy for re-unifying Cyprus, the main point would 
be for wage-fixing in the private sector to remain decentralised as 
between the north and south. There will of course be a progressive 
convergence of wage levels, fastest no doubt in the capital city and 
especially so in the public sector of the common state. However wage 
convergence should not be prematurely accelerated as a matter of policy 
at the common state level. This would ensure the greatest chance of 
triggering real economic growth and a catch-up process in northern 
Cyprus, rather than installing a permanently high unemployment level in 
the poorer part of the island. Under these conditions the simultaneous 
introduction of the euro in the whole of the island should assist the 
northern Cyprus economy to catch up, helping it move towards a more 
equal economic level, especially when combined with o ther equalising 
factors to be discussed further below (social security and EU structural 
funds). Above all the use of the euro in the whole of Cyprus will be an 
extremely strong credibility factor for persuading investors to regard 
northern Cyprus as a plausible investment location, and no longer 
‘another world’. 
3.2  Internal market and the four freedoms  
Here there is a mass of EU legislation which the Republic of Cyprus has 
already adopted to a large degree in the course of its accession 
negotiations. In  multi-tier member states there tends to be a sharing of 
competence, with the national level responsible for the transposition of 
EU laws into national laws that set norms and rules, whereas the sub-
national level may be responsible for at least some of the implementation. 
Belgium, for example, has categorised the internal market as a mainly 
federal but partly regional competence. 
                                                 
18 See Gros and Steinherr (1995). KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
37   
If the whole of Cyprus accedes to the EU in 2004, northern Cyprus would 
need special transitional arrangements of two types, as follows. 
Technical transition. The first type would concern purely technical 
questions over the speed with which northern Cyprus could reasonably be 
expected to catch up with implementation of the huge mass of existing 
EU laws for the internal market, the so-called acquis communautaire of 
60,000 pages of legal texts. The EU would surely expect the most rapid 
possible progress, but it would be politically unreasonable either to hold 
up the accession of Cyprus to the EU, or the re-unification of the island 
pending completion of this task. One might say that the political solution 
to the Cyprus problem should not be held hostage to the need to 
harmonise standards for the packaging of tomatoes. The EU would retain 
more than adequate incentives and sanctions to ensure that northern 
Cyprus would take its obligations seriously. For example the structural 
funds will be making large investments in the economic infrastructure of 
northern Cyprus. In any case, as soon as the basics of a political 
settlement are in sight, the EU will surely open up massive programmes 
of technical assistance to hasten the catch-up. 
Political transition and derogations. A second category of possible 
arrangements would relate to the political conditions for re-unification of 
the island. Of the four freedoms, special attention would need to paid to 
the freedom to reside, settle, and acquire property. It should be noted 
however that the rights deriving from the EU acquis are distinct from the 
human rights affecting displaced persons in Cyprus, whose status would 
probably need to be settled in the context of an initial settlement. As far 
as the EU acquis is concerned, as in the case of other accession candidate 
states there is acute sensitivity over the risks that a sudden liberalisation, 
alongside big differences in wealth between communities living in close 
proximity (e.g. around the German-Polish frontier) might lead to the 
richer community ‘buying up’ the less rich. The other two freedoms, for 
the movement of goods and services, would probably n ot see any 
transitional restrictions between the two constituent states.  
As regards possible restrictions on the freedom of residence, settlement 
and acquisition of property, there is an important distinction made in EU 
law between a) internal movements a nd transactions within member 
states and b) relations between member states. If the two communities in 
Cyprus were to agree to temporary or even permanent restrictions on the 
freedom of Greek Cypriots to settle and acquire property in northern 
Cyprus, and  vice versa for Turkish Cypriots in southern Cyprus, this 
would not entail a derogation from the EU law. Such a restriction would 
be considered an internal state matter and would only be a matter for the EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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laws and constitution of Cyprus, which would not concern the Treaty of 
Accession with the EU. Restrictions of this type apply within certain EU 
member states such as Austria, where there are inter-regional restrictions 
for the acquisition of property.
19  
The freedoms of settlement and acquisition property for other EU 
nationals in Cyprus would, however, fall under the jurisdiction of EU 
law. Some of the concerns in Cyprus would have features in common 
with concerns in several current candidate countries regarding the 
acquisition of property by ‘richer’ EU member states following an 
immediate liberalisation of the freedoms. In the current enlargement 
negotiations, the European Commission has distinguished between three 
types of property: agriculture land, second homes and investment. It has 
proposed seven-year transitions for agricultural land, five years for the 
acquisition of second homes and none for other investment, given the 
need of foreign direct investment in most of the candidate states. Poland, 
however, concerned about the possibility of large-scale German 
acquisition of agricultural land, requested initially a 14-year transition 
period, which it recently reduced to 12 years. The freedom of movement 
of labour and of residence rights was subject to 10-15 year transition 
periods in the cases of the Greek, Portuguese and Spanish accessions
20.  
Permanent derogations from the acquis communautaire are viewed by the 
EU much more unfavourably than temporary transitional arrangements, 
and in general are excluded on principle. However some permanent 
derogations to t he full application of the four freedoms have been 
accepted within the EU in the past in exceptional cases that were 
‘justified by history’. In Finland the Aaland Islands represent an 
autonomous entity of Swedish-speaking Finnish citizens, approximately 
25,000 in number. The right to ‘official domicile’ on the islands is 
controlled by the Aaland Islands authorities and is restricted to Swedish-
speaking people. Of course all Finnish and EU citizens have freedom of 
movement in and out of the islands. Without official domicile, however, 
the individual cannot participate in elections, stand for local office, own 
property or exercise a trade or a profession without a licence of the 
Aaland authorities. These special arrangements existed prior to Finland’s 
                                                 
19 T he judgement of the European Court of Justice about Austrian legislation 
restricting acquisition of property is Case C-302/97 of 1 June 1999, Klaus Konle 
v Republic of Austria. 
20 Options for handling the termination of temporary restrictions could be of two 
types: a) the restrictions end unless both communities agree to extend them, and 
b) the restrictions are prolonged until and unless both communities agree to end 
them.  KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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EU membership and were retained upon Finnish accession to the EU 
through a Protocol annexed to the Treaty of Accession. In Denmark there 
are still permanent restrictions on the acquisition of second homes by 
German citizens, more than a century after the settlement of the 
Schleswig-Holstein dispute. In the current round of enlargement 
negotiations, Malta succeeded in securing permanent restrictions on the 
purchase of property by foreigners. Following EU membership only 
foreigners who have been residing in Malta for more than five years will 
be able to freely acquire property in the island. In order to guarantee the 
permanent nature of these arrangements, a Protocol will be annexed to 
Malta’s Accession Treaty, which can only be altered with Malta’s 
consent.  
The menu of conceivable possibilities seems thus to range from Polish-
style transition periods to Finnish/Danish/Maltese-style permanent 
derogations. The European Commission has recently indicated that ‘the 
EU, with its acquis, will never be an obstacle to finding a solution to the 
Cyprus problem’. This statement was contained in President Prodi’s 
speech before the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus in 
Nicosia in November 2000,
21 and in the 2001 Commission Progress 
Report on the candidature of Cyprus.  
An alternative approach would be to extend some of the internal market 
freedoms in Cyprus to Turkey. Achieving a balance between the Greek 
and Turkish communities, which would be the rationale of Turkish 
Cypriot demands for ‘negative derogations’ vis-à-vis Greek interests, 
might be obtained instead by ‘positive derogations’ in favour of Turkish 
interests. The attraction of this alternative ‘positive’ approach lies in the 
fact that permanent negative derogations against Greek interests in 
northern Cyprus would not only be against the general principles of 
European integration, but could also prove practically unworkable. If 
negative derogations were only to apply to Greek interests, the 
restrictions on these transactions might be legally circumvented by the 
acquisition of property in Cyprus by other EU citizens or companies on 
behalf of Greek interests. If, on the other hand, negative derogations were 
to restrict investments in northern Cyprus from all EU member states, this 
would seriously slow down the economic development of the region. 
                                                 
21 Mr. Prodi continued: ‘The EU never seeks to determine the constitutional 
arrangements or the security arrangements of its member states. Such matters are 
up to them. I am confident that the EU can accommodate whatever arrangements 
the parties themselves agree to in the context of a political settlement. As an EU 
Member State Cyprus will of course have to participate in the Council of 
Ministers with one voice’ (Cyprus Weekly, 30 October 2001). EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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Alternative ‘positive’ measures would most easily apply to the movement 
of capital and acquisition of property. Turkish interests already have de 
facto complete access to northern Cyprus. However with the present 
regime of economic sanctions by the EU and the international community 
against northern Cyprus, the region is unattractive for large-scale inward 
investment. With re-unification of the island and its accession to the EU, 
this would change dramatically for the better, and inward Turkish 
investment might become an important factor for economic growth. It 
should however be noted that with the forthcoming extension of the 
Turkey-EU customs union to services and public procurement, several 
investment rights would automatically be given to Turkey in Cyprus (as 
an EU member state).  
The concept of ‘positive derogations’ would also have the considerable 
advantage of ensuring increased integration between Turkey and a new 
member of the Union. Positive derogations would not only allow Turkey 
to benefit from the same opportunities available to Greece and other EU 
member states in Cyprus. They would also allow Cyprus to act as another 
step in Turkey’s own EU membership drive. 
3.3  External trade policy 
Like for monetary policy, trade policy sees a major exclusive competence 
at the EU level that would be a concern of the common state. The 
customs service would presumably be a national competence. However 
there could be a coordination mechanism between the national and sub-
national levels (possibly Belgian-style), in order to determine the position 
of Cyprus in negotiations in the EU Council on trade policy.  
Since Turkey is already in a customs union with the EU, and northern 
Cyprus is de facto in a customs union with Turkey, the entry of the whole 
of Cyprus into the EU will on this trade policy front be another positive 
element in the deepening of EU-Turkish relations. The EU-Turkey 
customs union is in the process of being extended to services and public 
procurement as well.  
The joint membership of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in a customs union 
(as part of the Turkey-EU customs union) would eliminate the initial 
concern voiced by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, that EU membership 
by Cyprus before Turkey would violate Article 189 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Cyprus, which accorded most-favoured-nation treatment 
(MFN) to both Greece and Turkey. The Turkey-EU customs union was 
established in 1996, well after the 1992 ‘Set of Ideas’, which also 
reiterated the MFN clause of the 1960 constitution.  KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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3.4  Budgetary policy  
Membership of the eurozone requires, according to the Growth and 
Stability Pact, that the general budget balance (of the consolidated 
national and sub-national budgets) should respect certain norms, which 
generally aim to keep the budget deficit to a level below 3% of GDP. 
This is a further example of a mainly national level competence, 
requiring however a coordination mechanism with the sub-national 
budgets. The EU holds the national authorities responsible for seeing that 
the internal coordination arrangements are adequate.  
For example Germany has arranged a coordination process with the 17 
Länder, which amounts to an internal German Stability Pact.  
Belgium also has a system of coordination, which works through the 
Conseil superieur des finances, and may correspond more closely to 
future need of Cyprus. The Conseil consists of the finance ministers (or 
responsible officials) of the federal, community, regional and local levels 
of government. Each year the Conseil draws up an annual report, that 
allocates budget balance norms to all levels of government and individual 
regions and communities. In total these have to respect the norms of the 
EU Growth and Stability Pact. Recently the tendency has been to 
prescribe a convergence of budget balances for all entities on a zero 
nominal norm, which may be suitable for an economy seeking to reduce 
an excessively high public debt level. The annual report, with the norms 
it prescribes, is adopted by consensus. The federal minister of finance has 
no authority over the sub-national levels of government.    
The most effective constraint on the budgets of the constituent states 
would be the need to finance any deficits by borrowing in euro with no 
possibility for monetary accommodation from the central bank. This 
would contrast with the situation today in northern Cyprus where there 
seems to be no hard budget constraint, deficits being virtually 
automatically funded by Ankara.  
3.5   The tax system and revenue equalisation 
World-wide experience of taxation systems for multi-tier government 
structures suggests three broad models to choose from:  
-  Model 1  consists of a unified set of main taxes (personal and 
corporate income taxes, value-added tax, social security 
contributions, and excise) but with apportionment of the revenues 
between the national and sub-national budgets.  EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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-  Model 2 consists of common tax bases, a level of national tax rate, 
supplemented by further sub-national rates (the latter might differ).  
-  Model 3 sees higher degrees o f decentralisation, with certain taxes 
being exclusively levied by sub-national entities. In small territories 
with freedom of movement of persons and capital, however, tax rates 
cannot differ by wide margins without encountering serious 
difficulties in implementation.   
In all cases property taxes tend to be left to the sub-national or municipal 
level, together with other miscellaneous minor taxes that attach to 
immobile factors.  
The EU’s main requirements are a) harmonisation of the value-added tax 
base and ceding a small fraction of these revenues to the EU budget, and 
b) the ceding of all customs duties to the EU level.  
Belgium, for example, collects all the main taxes federally, but this is 
largely explained by the fact that Belgium comes from a formerly 
centralised state system. The federal level retains 100% of corporate tax 
revenues. For personal income tax and value-added taxes, about 40% of 
total revenues are returned to the regions or communities, apportioned in 
accordance with the residence of the tax-payers.  
For Cyprus there are strong reasons to make the value-added tax and 
customs duties the first source of common state revenues. Apart from the 
need for EU harmonisation and cession of revenues to the EU, the small 
size of the island of Cyprus makes a unified value-added tax system 
highly desirable: otherwise there would be shopping across communal 
borders just for fiscal reasons, indeed just a walk across a street in 
Nicosia. This would still leave open the possibility to return a share of 
value-added tax revenues to the constituent states.  
Corporation tax would be another strong candidate for a unified system, 
partly for EU requirements (e.g. constraining off-shore regimes); but here 
also differences would soon prove self-defeating, as companies would 
readily gravitate to the constituent state offering the most lenient tax 
regime. 
On the other hand, some differentiation of personal income tax regimes 
might be sustainable, for so long as labour and residential mobility 
remained limited across the communal borders.  
Depending upon the choice of tax system, there would be the question of 
the degree and mechanism of revenue equalisation  between the sub-
national budgets, especially given the highly unequal initial levels of 
economic development between northern and southern Cyprus. It would KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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be conventional to arrange for the fiscal capacity of the two constituent 
states to be equalised through inter-governmental transfers to a specified 
degree (the percentage would be a negotiation variable). The technical 
form of the equalisation formula would differ according to the model of 
taxation chosen: a thorough comparison of existing systems is available 
in study of the European Commission.
22 If the tax system levied taxes 
mainly at the national level, then the system could apportion the transfer 
of revenues to the sub-national budgets calculated to equalise revenue per 
capita to a given degree (70, 80 or 90%, etc.). This would be a ‘vertical’ 
transfer system, from national to sub-national budgets. However 
‘horizontal’ methods also exist, notably in the case of Germany 
(Horizontalfinanzaugleich) where the Länder cooperate in making 
equalisation calculations, and execute the resulting transfers directly 
between themselves.  
While the precise mechanisms of inter-regional redistribution of public 
finance are many and varied, there is one general finding that emerges 
from the comparison of systems common to both centralised and 
decentralised states (of the EU and the advanced federations elsewhere). 
Whatever the mechanism for inter-regional transfers, the outcome in 
terms of degree of equalisation of inter-regional living standards is rather 
similar. The evidence analysed in the study undertaken for the EU
23 has 
shown that the poorest regions of an advanced economy will tend to 
receive transfers offsetting about 40% of the per capita income 
differentials. Such a prospect would of course be of great importance for 
today’s northern Cyprus, where living standards are only one-third of the 
level achieved in southern Cyprus. Transfers of this order of magnitude 
also mean automatic (and invisible) financing for large current account 
balance-of-payments imbalances between the regions of integrated 
economies. The same study observed balance-of-payments deficits in 
poor peripheral regions of advanced economies of amounts of up to 30% 
of the GDP of the beneficiary regions. Interestingly, amounts 
approaching this order of magnitude are seen today in the transfers from 
Turkey to northern Cyprus.  
The pertinence of working out a systematic scheme for fiscal distribution 
is emphasised by the prospect of a total restructuring of the finances of 
northern Cyprus, assuming that Turkish government subsidies to northern 
Cyprus may be rapidly reduced if not eliminated, given Turkey’s own 
grave financial crisis. Alongside this there would the introduction of EU 
grants and loans (see further below). A significant redistribution system 
                                                 
22 See Macdougall (1977). 
23 Op cit.  EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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would naturally go together with a substantial content to the competences 
of the common state.  
3.6  Social security finance 
At some stage Cyprus would move back to an integrated social security 
system, since otherwise there would be insufficient incentive for people 
to migrate over short distances in order to profit from differences (starting 
with Nicosia). To minimise distortions to the economy it would be best 
initially for monetary social security benefits to have a significant 
earnings-related component, rather than flat-rate money amounts. 
Similarly social security contributions should be earnings-related. Even 
in these circumstances, however, an integrated social security system 
would be likely to produce automatically a degree of financial 
equalisation between south and north.  
Implementation of benefit systems would be undertaken by agencies 
managed by the sub-national authorities. Such agencies could have 
visible community identities (e.g. staffing, language of service, names of  
agencies, etc.), even if the overall financing was effectively underwritten 
at the national level.  
3.7   Regional development 
This would be a major responsibility of the constituent states. However 
financial contributions would be available with grants from the structural 
funds of the EU budget and loans from the European Investment Bank, 
especially for the poorer northern Cyprus. The  general financial 
framework for EU contributions has to be negotiated in the EU 
institutions, and certainly would require a coordination mechanism 
between the national and sub-national levels of government. This could 
be a domain for a political choice in the case of Cyprus between Types II 
or III in the Belgian method of coordination for EU Council meetings 
(i.e. either the federal minister supported by one rotating sub-national 
representative or the other way round). 
The rules and criteria of the existing structural funds of the EU would see 
the whole of northern Cyprus recognised as 'Objective 1 Priority Region', 
whereas southern Cyprus would not qualify because of its high GDP per 
capita and low unemployment levels. As regards the scale of assistance 
that would be provided to northern Cyprus, the European Commission 
published precise figures on 30 January 2002.
24 Before reporting these, it 
                                                 
24 European Commission,  ‘Commission offers a fair and solid approach for 
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is worth setting out some of the parameters within which EU policies are 
set.  
As a maximum, the EU has adopted the guideline that aid to newly 
acceding states should not exceed 4% of the GDP of the new member 
state as a whole, which in the case of Cyprus would amount to about 
€400 million. If as a mechanical calculation it was supposed that 4/5 of 
this order of magnitude was granted to northern Cyprus as an ‘Objective 
1 Priority Region’, the amount would be about €320 per year, which is 
equivalent to about 31% of the actual GDP of northern Cyprus.
25 In 
addition the European Investment Bank might normally contribute about 
half as much again in loans, making a rough total of €500 million per 
year, or 50% of GDP. These amounts are much higher than might be 
actually expected in view of the likely problems of absorptive capacity. 
On the other hand, investment ratios of up to 30% of GDP have been 
recorded in very fast growing economies, especially in reconstruction and 
‘catch-up’ contexts.  
At a minimum, one may look at what the EU has been doing in its ultra-
peripheral islands, such as the Canary Islands and Madeira, which are 
somewhat comparable to Cyprus in size, climate, peripherality and in the 
importance of the tourism sector. These regions of Spain and Portugal, 
while being viewed with favour as recipients of EU Structural Funds 
because of their peripherality, have however b een in tough competition 
with large areas of the mainland Spain and Portugal for Structural Funds. 
Taking nonetheless the examples of the Canary Islands and Madeira, in 
these cases about €3 billion of grants were made in the six-year period 
1994-99, or €500 million per year, but for a total population of 3.5 
million. Scaled back on a per capita basis (200,000 population instead of 
3.5 million) northern Cyprus would receive only €30 million of grants per 
year.  
Within this wide range of €30 to €320 million per year for Structural 
Fund grants, it may be argued that northern Cyprus could get a result 
closer to the higher than lower end because of two arguments. First there 
is the absence of competition from other parts of Cyprus for intensive aid. 
                                                 
25 Rough arithmetic, based on data in Annex A: northern Cyprus,  population of  
209,000 x $4,978 per capita = $1,040 million; southern Cyprus, population of 
669,000 x $13,272 per capita = $8,879 million. Total Cyprus GDP = $8,879 + 
1,040 = €8,915 million; x 4% = $355 million = €400 million. Note: these figures 
are subject to revision, given the uncertainty of economic data for northern 
Cyprus. Also the official EU calculations make use of purchasing power parity 
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Secondly, there will be special costs of the post-conflict settlement, both 
for rehabilitation and compensation for property rights, and a political 
case for a conflict-resolution bonus. On the other hand, Cyprus as a 
whole has easily the highest GDP per capita of the accession candidate 
states, and the level of southern Cyprus even exceeds that of Portugal and 
Greece. Overall there should be for the small economy of northern 
Cyprus an investment boom, sufficient to transform the economic 
landscape within a decade. Such has already been the experience of 
regions of Portugal, for example. The chances of a fast catch-up with 
southern Cyprus could be very favourable, as long as the end to the 
conflict was truly credible. This also assumes that the resources would be 
efficiently used, rather than basically funding the northern Cyprus budget 
deficit as today with Turkish aid (see Annex A).  
The European Commission published on 30 January 2002, first 
indications of the likely scale of financial assistance to Cyprus. The total 
amounts foreseen in commitments for the northern part of Cyprus 
through Structural Funds and pre-accession aid (which northern Cyprus 
did not benefit from during the RoC’s accession process) are €39 million 
in 2004, €67 million in 2005 and €100 million in 2006. Most of these 
funds would, for northern Cyprus, be spent on investment in renewal of 
economic infrastructures and re-training programmes. A special need will 
be for renewing transport and communications infrastructures between 
north and south across the ‘green line’, and rehabilitating the ghost town 
of Varosha. Following the experience of Portugal, the EU could also 
make grants for investment in institutions of higher education and public 
health (universities, technical colleges, hospitals, etc.). Loan finance for 
investment in the private sector, a well as public infrastructure, will 
additionally be available from the European Investment Bank (EIB), for 
example for rehabilitation and modernisation of the tourist economy. The 
amounts of EIB funding cannot be decided in advance, and would depend 
on sound projects being forthcoming. However past experience would 
suggest that the EIB contribution could add the grants from the structural 
funds by something in the range of 50-100%.  
Going in the other direction, budget support for northern Cyprus from 
Turkey would presumably be cut in the event of re-unification and EU 
accession. In January 2001, Turkey and the TRNC signed a financial 
protocol foreseeing economic (budgetary) support from Turkey totalling 
$350 million for the following three years. This figure represented a drop 
in aid from previous years, considering that transfers in 2000 alone 
exceeded $200 million.  
 KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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3.8  Summary of budget financing issues 
From the foregoing section, one can anticipate a complex set of 
interdependent financial issues to be resolved as and when the 
negotiations over re-unification and EU accession approach the point of a 
visible outcome. These essentially concern the funding of the public 
finances and rehabilitation of northern Cyprus.  
A first assembly of the main components of the equation can be set out, 
with a preliminary assignment of plausible responsibilities, as follows: 
•  Turkey already requests northern Cyprus to cut its budget deficit. 
While Turkish grants and loans to northern Cyprus are currently very 
large for the recipient (23% of GDP and over 40% of budget 
resources – see Annex A), they are still a small amount for Turkey – 
as long the transfers are made in Turkish lire. However it would only 
be a matter of time before this last condition would cease to be met 
(the scenario above called for Cyprus to accede to the euro area 
perhaps in 2006).  
•  The tax collection performance of northern Cyprus is currently 
notoriously weak, given a large grey economy, and would need to be 
seriously improved, but this will take a few years. 
•  The level of expenditure on employment and social transfers in the 
public sector of northern Cyprus has become disproportionately large 
during the last decades, and will surely need to be reduced 
drastically, as the economy is restructured and set on a new growth 
path. However this also will take a number of years.  
•  A first contribution from the common state level might come 
automatically through centralised funding of the operating balances 
of the social security agencies, if some such solidarity mechanism 
were desired. 
•  The EU budget would normally contribute grants only for ‘structural 
purposes’, including public infrastructure, education and re-training, 
some public health investments, and technical assistance for catch-up 
in relation to the accession.  
•  The EIB can contribute loan finance but only for public infrastructure 
and private investment.  
•  Some of the costs of property compensation funds might be met by 
bilateral donors (see below on refugees).  EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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•  Overall, it seems quite likely that the above elements will leave still a 
significant margin of shortfall of budgetary resources for northern 
Cyprus, especially in the first years. Exactly when would depend on 
the nature of the budgetary regime of the common state, and on the 
timing of Cyprus’ accession to the eurozone.  
Options for meeting this shortfall would seem to be two. The first would 
be budgetary transfers from the common state budget through some kind 
of fiscal capacity equalisation mechanism  of the kind commonly 
observed in multi-tier government structures. But this would depend on 
the nature of the common state. The second option might be a transitional 
budget grant from the EU to northern Cyprus. In general the EU does not 
make grants of this type, and they are conspicuous for their absence from 
the Commission’s recent proposals for the structural funds. But there 
have been some exceptional cases, notably in the context of conflicts and 
their resolution (see the Balkan examples of Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Montenegro in recent years).  
3.9  Energy, transport and environment 
These are further major domains that may see a complex sharing of 
competences in the multi-tier EU setting. All are the subject of important 
EU legislation, with the transport and energy domains forming part of the 
single market. Regulatory policies for the liberalisation of competition in 
such areas as civil aviation and energy production and distribution are 
latecomers to the EU single market policies, but are nonetheless the 
subject of much fundamental legislation currently. Similarly the 
environment field, while not regarded as a single market policy, is also 
the subject of much norm-setting and negotiation over the EU’s 
international environmental commitments (such as global warming and 
emissions trading).  
The Belgian experience may be used as an illustration of how 
competences may be divided in some detail. In the  energy field the 
regions in Belgium are empowered to regulate ‘regional aspects of energy 
policy’, whereas the federal authorities handle issues which for economic 
or technical reasons cannot be divided and require equal treatment at 
national level. More precisely this means the following division of 
labour: 
Regional competences 
•  Electricity distribution through networks of up to 70,000 kV 
•  Public gas distribution 
•  District heating networks KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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•  New and renewable energy sources (e.g. wind power) 
•  Recovery of waste energy 
•  Rational use of energy 
Federal competences 
•  Equipment of the electricity sector 
•  Large infrastructures for energy storage, transport and production 
•  Nuclear fuel cycle 
•  Tariff policies 
Similarly in the field of transport, responsibilities in Belgium are split 
according to a similar rationale, with maximum regional decentralisation 
where feasible. Buses, ports and waterways are regional responsibilities, 
but railways and civil aviation and air traffic control is federal. For 
vehicle safety the norms are set at federal level, but their implementation 
is executed at regional level. Roads are regional, except that the main 
highways are managed in cooperation with the federal authorities.  
The main responsibility for  environmental policy in Belgium has also 
been entrusted to the regions as a result of constitutional reforms in the 
last 20 years. The formal division of competences works as follows:  
Regional competences 
•  Protection of the soil, water, air and noise environment 
•  Waste management and sewage 
•  Control of dangerous industries 
•  Land conservation and nature, hunting and fishing 
Federal competences 
•  Product rules and environmental taxes 
•  Nuclear waste 
•  Transit of waste materials 
Belgian law also makes consultation procedures mandatory between the 
levels of government where the environmental issues raise matters of 
trans-boundary concern. The federal competences are largely 
concentrated in areas where EU legislation dominates. Residual 
competences not explicitly attributed to date belong to the regional level.  
Almost every aspect of the federal prerogatives is subject to regional 
involvement through consultation procedures. In fact there are no less 
than 25 expert groups that bring together federal and regional officials 
within the framework of the Coordination Committee for Environment 
Policy. Leadership of these groups is attributed to federal or regional EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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officials, depending on who is judged to be the most interested and 
competent actor. 
In general there are some important lessons from the Belgian experience 
– thorough analyses for the environment and energy sectors are 
available.
26 There is a maximum effort to attribute exclusive competences 
to federal or regional levels. This may be considered a healthy principle 
in general for the purposes of clarity of governmental responsibilities. 
However the Belgian experience suggests that the definition of such 
competences has to be m ade at a more disaggregated level than the 
sectoral policy headings of conventional government departments. It is 
found that ‘environmental’, ‘energy’ and ‘transport’ policy are all too 
large and heterogeneous blocks of policy to be attributed to one level  of 
government in a multi-tier EU setting.  
3.10   Agriculture 
This is another sector with very strong EU powers, but where practical 
implementation may be devolved to the sub-national level. This is what 
Belgium has done, and since 2001 agriculture has been transferred, 
according to the schema in Table 3, from Type II to Type III. Agriculture 
is considered now a mainly regional competence, with some federal 
interests. There is no longer a Belgian ministry of agriculture, or federal 
minister, just an agriculture section in the foreign ministry. In the absence 
of a federal ministry of agriculture, agriculture is the only area in which a 
deputy minister of foreign affairs represents Belgium in the Council of 
Ministers, supported by two assessors from Flanders a nd Wallonia 
without rotation. There will still have to be a Belgian agricultural 
intervention agency to execute the European Commission’s instructions 
(to buy or sell intervention stocks), but its location is not yet decided.  
3.11   Culture and education 
Greek and Turkish would obviously both be the official languages of a 
re-unified Cyprus, as was the case under the 1960 constitution in any case 
and remains theoretically so for the present Republic of Cyprus. This 
means that the acts of the common state would all be bi-lingual, as is the 
case in other bi-lingual or multi-lingual states, such Belgium, Canada and 
Switzerland. Furthermore, to begin with, Turkish would probably be the 
official language in northern Cyprus and Greek in southern Cyprus, as 
Flemish is in Flanders and French in Wallonia. For Nicosia and possibly 
Famagusta, there might be a bilingual regime at some stage like the great 
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‘agglomeration’ of Brussels. If and when the two communities begin to 
overlap, particularly in the border areas between the two regions, some 
mixed arrangements could be considered (see below on the different 
options) 
However accession of a re-unified Cyprus to the EU would have itself a 
further extremely important external effect: the Turkish language would 
become one of the official languages of the European Union. This in turn 
means that all the acts of the EU would appear in Turkish, which will 
facilitate the rapprochement and integration of Turkey itself with the EU. 
This will work both in practical ways (accessibility of EU texts for 
Turkish business people, politicians, civil society, media, etc.), as well at 
the level of sentiment and perceptions of all Turkish-speaking peoples.   
The policy domains of culture and education would be exclusive 
competences of the constituent states, or language communities. Where 
the territory and the language community completely coincide, as is 
presently the case in Cyprus, the organisation of education policy can be 
relatively straightforward. Schooling and higher education would also be 
an exclusive competence of the constituent states, subject only to the 
setting of norms at the national level in order to assure comparability and 
mutual recognition of educational standards, where there is also an 
important EU role in mutual recognition too. Teaching of Greek as a 
second language in the schools of northern Cyprus would be assured, just 
as the teaching of Turkish as a second language would be in southern 
Cyprus.  
However if and when patterns of ethno-demographic residence change, 
and the cultural communities overlap geographically, the task becomes 
more complicated. In the case of Cyprus, as openness is restored and 
inter-ethnic trust gradually improved, such changes could naturally 
happen, although maybe only slowly for some years. If and when the 
Greek and Turkish populations residing in the north and south 
respectively increase, there would be the question of how their interests 
are served by government structures. Perhaps these issues will remain 
theoretical for quite some time, but it may be useful at least for the 
medium to long run to bear in mind that there can be three basic models: 
-  The territorial model.  Here the sub-national governments coincide 
with the two language communities and exercise culture and 
education competences exclusively and only in their territories. 
-  The bilingual model. Here there is a bilingual/cultural regime for 
selected territories, such as for the national capital.  EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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-  The personalised model. In cases where there is a wide dispersion of 
reciprocal minorities, the language communities can make available 
services (such as in education and cultural fields) and exercise certain 
competences at the level of the individual, rather than the territory.   
Belgium offers some examples. In the Flemish and Walloon regions the 
public sector school and university system remains exclusively 
monolingual. However private educational establishments are authorised 
to teach in the ‘other’ Belgian language, and other languages of the 
world. The Brussels region has a special bilingual status, some features of 
which might at some stage become relevant to Nicosia and Famagusta. 
The ‘Brussels-capital’ region has both French and Flemish public sector 
schools, which are controlled by the Flemish and French language 
community governments  (this is a hybrid case, a cross between the 
bilingual and personalised models identified above). Particularly if the 
two cities of Nicosia and Famagusta-Varosha were to be administered by 
a joint city council (see Box 2 in the preceding chapter), one would 
envisage that community services in these cities would remain under the 
separate control of the constituent state authorities.  
The several models mentioned may be adapted to changing ethno-
demographic patterns. One is where the inner city of the capital  sees 
important changes, with growing concentrations of foreign immigrant 
communities. Another is where the suburbs of the capital may expand 
very fast, and acquire quite different ethno-demographic characteristics 
compared to the historical ones. A third is the case where there would be 
an increase in a wide but thin dispersion of citizens from one community 
in the territory of the other. Once a minority-language community reaches 
a certain threshold, one technique could be to require the communal 
administration to deal with citizens in the language of their choice.  
The Belgian case also provides an example of how administrative 
practice avoids the identification of individuals as belonging to one or 
another language community in any formal or legal sense.  However 
citizens indicate to the local administration the language they prefer for 
the text of their identity cards. Concerning community services as well as 
elections, citizens in bi-communal Brussels are free to switch between the 
two community services at any point in time. 
Both southern and northern Cyprus already have important centres of 
international educational activity. For example the Eastern Mediterranean 
University in northern Cyprus and Intercollege, Cyprus College and the 
University of Cyprus  in the south all teach wholly or extensively in 
English. Educational facilities of quality are provided by independent 
educational institutions, and these are likely to expand, presumably under KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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regulations fixed by the department of education of the constituent state 
in which they were located. The common state (or the departments of 
education of the constituent states acting jointly) might retain 
responsibility for certain specialised institutions, schools and institutes of 
higher education.  
A valuable instrument of reconciliation could be founded in a multi-
lingual high school in Nicosia, along the lines of the European Schools of 
Brussels. The main feature would be the running of several language 
streams, following the same curriculum, on a single campus. Each student 
would be required to follow a certain number of courses in a second 
working language, apart from studies in a third ‘foreign’ language. 
Courses in the second working language include (in the European 
Schools) geography and history. The EU itself could, for example, take 
the initiative to found a new European School of Nicosia, building on the 
experience of the existing network of European schools that are already 
established in Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, Germany and England.
27  
Historical textbooks would be the subject of bi-communal initiatives to 
reverse dreadful ethnic biases that have come in the wake of conflict and 
separation of the communities. There have already been pioneer projects 
in both Cyprus and the Balkans,
28 which have at least developed a set of 
principles that should be respected in producing such textbooks. In a re-
unified Cyprus one could set up a joint committee of legislators and 
teachers, selected with the aid of cross-voting methods to enhance 
moderation, to work towards the achievement of these objectives, even 
with education remaining a competence of the constituent states.  
                                                 
27 These European Schools were all established to serve the needs of the families 
of European civil servants. They accept other students, however, and one could 
imagine an EU policy initiative to set up and support new European schools for 
situations like Nicosia in the near future, as well as in some Balkan capital cities. 
28  The Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-East Europe has 
sponsored a Joint History Project (JHP), leading to the forthcoming (2002) 
publications: Teaching History in Southeastern Europe, and Clio in the Balkans 
– The Politics of History Education, both edited by C. Koulouri at the University 
of Western Thrace in Thessaloniki. We are grateful to the Center's board member 
responsible for the JHP for distilling for us the following principles flowing from 
this ongoing project: a) rigorous accuracy, b) recognition that the study of history 
is an ongoing process, c) refusal to ‘prettify’ history by concealing ugly 
episodes, d) acknowledgement of  the positive achievements of the ‘other’, e) 
mention of one's own community's failings, f) avoidance of facile caricature of 
the ‘other’ and g) presentation of other points of view even if one's own is 
ultimately preferred.  
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3.12   Citizenship and human rights 
Axiomatically for a single common state, there would be a single Cyprus 
citizenship, and supporting documents such as the passport. The general 
law on the criteria for acceding to Cypriot citizenship would also need to 
be defined at the national level. In the context of the current negotiations 
the idea of a bi-communal agency to deal with citizenship questions has 
also been suggested. An interim bi-communal authority to determine the 
precise numbers of Cypriots may indeed be necessary. However, in order 
not to complicate Cyprus’ institutional structure further, the bi-communal 
agency should probably be integrated in common state institutions in the 
medium term.  
However, implementation of the policy could be dealt with by the two 
constituent states. While the general policy would be determined at the 
central level, the technical regulations and implementation of the policy 
would fall under the competence of the constituent states. Hence, 
citizenship questions could effectively be shared between the two levels 
of government. In addition EU citizenship would represent another 
increasingly important layer in this field of competence.  
Decentralised implementation however requires a considerable level of 
trust between the two communities, as one community may fear that 
decentralised implementation of citizenship would be manipulated by the 
other community to alter the demographic balance of the island. Until 
trust is restored, one could thus imagine that if implementation is 
decentralised, the central authority would retain some monitoring 
capacity over the decentralised administration throughout the island.  
The question o f citizenship is inextricably linked to the question of the 
Turkish settlers. Figures on the numbers of ‘settlers’ are disputed. Greek 
Cypriot officials claim that the number of Anatolian settlers in northern 
Cyprus may actually exceed the number of indigenous Turkish Cypriots. 
They consider that a high number of these settlers should be repatriated to 
Turkey in so far as they distort the demographic balance on the island and 
would prevent the emergence of a ‘Cypriot identity’ following 
reunification. The T RNC leadership instead holds that the settlers are 
considerably fewer and that many came from Turkey because of the 
demand for labour in northern Cyprus following partition.  
The precise number of settlers cannot be easily determined. This is not 
only because of the politicisation of this question. Who exactly would 
count as a settler given that many of these people have been living in 
Cyprus for decades, they may be married to Turkish Cypriots or may 
have actually been born in Cyprus? KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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Citizenship policy at the common state level would have to answer these 
and other questions. One could imagine that the common state authorities 
could come up with a relatively simple set of criteria for citizenship. For 
example, only those residents who have lived in Cyprus f or a given 
number of years, were born in Cyprus or were married to a Cypriot could 
claim common state citizenship.  
Another question would be that of emigrated Cypriots. Would all the 
emigrated Greek and Turkish Cypriots be able to claim common state 
citizenship, including those who were born and always lived abroad in 
Europe, the US and Australia? Again the common state authorities would 
have to determine a general policy line and criteria for Cypriot 
citizenship.  
Human rights are already the subject of comprehensive codification at the 
European level, with the Republic of Cyprus, as well as Greece and 
Turkey, having acceded to the European Convention for Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and all related protocols, and as implemented 
by the Court of Justice of Strasbourg. This would also be the case for the 
common state. It is possible that the EU's 2004 Intergovernmental 
Conference will give to this jurisprudence a more directly applicable 
status in EU law.  
Finally, concerning citizenship, there would be the increased relative 
importance of EU citizenship within the EU. The parties to the Cyprus 
conflict have tended to associate the question of citizenship with identity 
politics and in particular demographic balances on the island. As such 
this question has been highly politicised, reducing the scope for 
compromise between the parties. However, within the European Union, 
citizenship is acquiring a different meaning and is being increasingly 
associated with human, economic and social rights, rather than  with 
exclusively national or community affiliations. The same could be true 
for Cyprus. Cypriot citizenship could be articulated as a civic notion 
concerning rights and obligations and not a question of ethnic and 
community identification. Adding the EU dimension to the question of 
Cypriot citizenship could facilitate an agreement between the two parties.  
3.13   Movement of persons, immigration and asylum 
There is a growing body of EU law and regulations governing the 
movement and residence of persons in EU member states. In addition 
there are the rules of the Schengen system, which are increasingly being 
integrated into EU law. All the candidate states are expected to adopt the 
whole of the EU and Schengen  acquis, and to be capable of 
implementation at the time of accession. However the EU does not intend EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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to lift all frontier controls with the new member states for some time 
(probably years) after accession. 
The fundamentals of policy over immigration, visas and residence 
permits would be set at the level of the common state, although there are 
ways of partial decentralisation of the system. For example the granting 
of work and/or residence permits may depend on objective conditions in 
the locality immediately concerned. There can be room for regional/local 
discretion in making decisions within the bounds of criteria set at the 
national level (as actually in Belgium). 
The question of immigration, work and residence permits would also 
affect the future of the Turkish settlers in Cyprus. As mentioned above, 
not all Turkish settlers may receive Cypriot citizenship. The question is 
whether those settlers who would not become Cypriot citizens would be 
forced to leave Cyprus. The forced repatriation (some settlers may 
voluntarily choose to leave of course) of these s ettlers may both be 
unfeasible and it would run against the logic of attempting to de-ethnicise 
Cypriot politics and to construct a civic Cypriot identity instead.  
Rapid economic development in the southern part of the island has been 
followed by a considerable flow of immigrant workers into the Republic 
(predominantly of Philippino and Russian origin), and southern Cyprus 
has become increasingly multicultural. With time the same would be true 
for the north as well. Repatriating Turkish settlers would also be a form 
of exclusionism vis-à-vis Turkey and counter the idea that Cyprus’ EU 
membership could encourage the progressive integration of Turkey into 
the EU.  
The EU has adopted a common visa policy vis-à-vis third countries. In 
particular there are lists of third countries that are exempt from visa 
requirements, those for whom visas are required and those for whom 
visas may be required at the choice of the member state. Turkey is 
currently on the list of countries for which visas are required. Although 
Bulgaria and Romania have recently acceded to the visa-free list, this is 
not yet in sight for Turkey. The introduction of visas for Turkish citizens 
who are not legally resident in Cyprus would be an unfortunate 
consequence of re-unification and accession to the EU.  
Ways may be sought to avoid or at least mitigate the negative effects. 
One approach would be to intensify measures in Turkey to qualify for 
visa-free treatment. This may not, however, be achievable in the short 
run. One degree of freedom open to Schengen member states lies in the 
remaining competence of the member states for issuing long-term, multi-
entry visas (‘Schengen visas’, administered by the member states but KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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subject to common rules and controls, are only issued for three-month 
periods). Cyprus would need to establish adequate consular facilities in 
Turkey.  
Other approaches might be to build on existing precedents in the EU for 
territories separated from the continent by sea. This includes not only 
Ireland and the United Kingdom (outside Schengen), but also the Spanish 
provinces of Ceuta and Melilla enclaved in Morocco (Spain being in 
Schengen). For Cyprus there might be a transitional provision to permit 
Cyprus to remain visa-free for Turkish citizens for a transitional period, 
until Cyprus itself was accorded complete freedom of movement within 
the Schengen system (which could be some years after accession), or 
until Turkey acceded to the EU’s visa-free list, which could certainly 
precede Turkey’s full accession to the EU. Air and sea connections from 
Cyprus to the rest of the Schengen area and of the EU would be subject to 
control of passport or identity cards upon arrival. Citizens of Cyprus 
would of course have full access and citizen rights in the EU, comparable 
to that enjoyed by Spanish citizens arriving from Ceuta or Melilla, or 
British and Irish citizens arriving on the continent. Ireland and the UK 
have these arrangements as non-Schengen member states, but Spain is a 
Schengen member state.
29  
Cyprus has already provisionally closed the Justice and Home Affairs and 
Schengen chapters of its negotiations, but this was done before the recent 
re-opening of prospects for early re-unification and EU accession for the 
whole of Cyprus. Since Cyprus will presumably want to retain the fullest 
possible accession to Schengen, one could envisage a special protocol, 
under which Cyprus might accede to the Schengen Information System, 
and apply Schengen visa rules for all third countries, except for the 
special case of Turkey. Turkish citizens would, during the transitional 
period, have to obtain a Schengen visa to go to the rest of the Schengen 
area and EU.   
The question of EU visa policy towards Turkey in the context of Cyprus’ 
accession is only the tip of the iceberg of the wider set of issues for EU-
                                                 
29 See the Agreement on the accession of Spain to the Schengen Convention, 
Final Act, 25 June 1991,  Official Journal L239, Vol. 43, 22 September 2000. 
Moroccan citizens from the Tetouan and Nador provinces remain able to enter 
Ceuta and Melilla without visas. For its part ‘Spain shall m aintain checks (on 
identity and documents) on sea and air connections departing from Ceuta and 
Melilla and having as their sole destination any other place on Spanish territory. 
To the same end, Spain shall maintain checks on internal flights and on regular 
ferry connections departing from the towns of Ceuta and Melilla to a destination 
in another State party to the [Schengen] Convention’. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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Turkish relations in the field of justice and home affairs. As recently 
analysed thoroughly by Kemal Kirisçi (2002), policies on asylum and 
irregular immigration pose hugely sensitive issues for Turkey, given its 
traditional openness to peoples of Turkic culture (Azerbaijan and Central 
Asia), and its frontiers with Iran (presently visa-free) and Iraq (with the 
Kurdish overlap). The EU and Turkey have embarked on a process of 
convergence by Turkey on the EU acquis in these areas, with obviously 
tough implications for these eastern neighbours of Turkey. Future EU 
visa policy for Turkey in relation to Cyprus should be judged in this 
wider context, with maximum effort to find constructive solutions along 
the lines suggested. 
3.14   Foreign policy 
Foreign policy was long considered a prime and exclusive competence of 
the nation state. The status of the sovereign state in international law 
remains of exceptional importance, as of course of great political 
significance. However the execution of foreign policy becomes a less 
exclusive competence in multi-tier government systems, where the 
alternative paradigm assigns entities responsibility for the external 
relations aspects of their domestic competences and responsibilities. In 
the ‘Set of Ideas’, the UN proposed that such a paradigm, known also as 
the principle of in foro interno in foro externo, be applied to Cyprus.  
Belgium has also endorsed this principle of  in foro interno in foro 
externo. Since the 1993 constitutional reforms, each level of government 
in Belgium has some limited competences to conclude international 
treaties and agreements with other states or sub-state entities. The limits 
relate to the respective areas of internal policy competence. Treaties can 
fall under the exclusive competence of one level of government. In these 
cases ratification of a treaty or agreement needs only to occur within the 
legislature of the relevant level of government. When instead an 
international treaty falls under the shared competence of different levels 
of government  (either if the relevant policy area is itself a shared 
competence, or if the treaty in question covers different policy areas 
falling under the competence of different levels of government), then 
there is a system of coordination to avoid conflicts of competence. 
Ratification requires the consent of all the legislative bodies involved. 
Regions are thus free to engage in external relations provided they adhere 
to general principles of Belgian foreign policy. An inter-ministerial 
conference is set up to ensure the general coherence of foreign policy.  
At the level of diplomatic representations in foreign countries, Belgium 
has developed a system whereby the Flemish or Walloon regions may KOMPETENZ KATALOG 
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have their own representatives working within the Belgian embassy, but 
responsible to the Flemish or Walloon regional/community governments. 
Important competences handled by such representatives include 
cooperation in cultural and education projects, and export and investment 
promotion. The Belgian Permanent Representation to the EU includes 
delegates from the Flemish and Walloon regions, whereas the Spanish 
regions and German Länder have separate representations in Brussels. 
This is a reminder for Cyprus that two-entity states can do things that 
multi-entity states find impractical. 
The handling of EU affairs itself requires a huge task of coordination in 
all government systems, and especially so in multi-tier systems, as 
already described in detail in an earlier section. Indeed EU affairs may no 
longer be considered ‘foreign’ or ‘international’ affairs within its member 
states, but rather another dimension to their internal affairs. Foreign 
ministries retain a role of coordinating EU policy, with their permanent 
representatives in Brussels (in the COREPER committee of EU 
ambassadors) playing a pivotal role in the management of each country’s 
EU policy-making. It has become more often the case, however, that 
coordination of EU affairs is handled by the office of the prime minister, 
requiring more political authority than usually e xists in the ‘foreign 
ministry’. 
3.15   Military and police forces 
If Cyprus becomes a de-militarised state, as agreed in the 1979 High 
Level agreement and also proposed in the ‘Set of Ideas’, there would be 
no ministry of defence at any level. However the security system, with 
international guarantees and peacekeeping presence for as long as 
necessary, will be a necessary part of the new regime, as addressed in the 
next section. 
The organisation of the police force would presumably be done mainly at 
the level of the two constituent states, as proposed by the ‘Set of Ideas’, 
although there could be some national force and/or FBI-type agency at 
the common state level.   
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CHAPTER 4 
TERRITORY, REFUGEES AND SECURITY 
egotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaderships 
will also be tackling a set of crucial transitional issues relating to 
territory, refugee return and security. The security regime will 
also have to have qualities of permanence, however, underwritten by 
guarantees. The security guarantees and peacekeeping functions would 
presumably involve the three original guarantor states (Greece, Turkey 
and the UK) as well as some combination of roles of the UN or possibly 
NATO or the EU.  
4.1   Territory 
It is generally understood that a settlement of the Cyprus question would 
entail some territorial readjustments. While the details of such 
adjustments are not known at this stage, some simple parameters seem 
widely expected. For example the territory to be controlled by the future 
northern constituent state would be smaller than that currently controlled 
by the Turkish Cypriot community. Also, the percentage of the total 
territory of the future northern constituent state would be greater than the 
percentage of the Turkish Cypriot population on the island. 
During past negotiations, and in particular in the context of the 1992 
discussions when the UN proposed a rough map to the two sides, the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership was willing to consider a Turkish Cypriot 
‘canton’ amounting to 29%+ of the island’s territory. The town of 
Varosha on the southern edge of Famagusta was a clear candidate for 
return to the Greek community, since it was originally largely owned by 
Greek Cypriots and foreigners, and has not been re-populated since 1974 
(it has remained a ‘ghost town’). But the Turkish Cypriot leadership 
objected to returning Morphou in northwest Cyprus to the status of a 
Greek Cypriot ‘canton’. The Morphou area was seen as the most fertile in 
northern Cyprus, and as such critical to the Turkish Cypriot economy. 
The Greek Cypriot leadership accepted the UN map (reproduced at the 
end of the of the ‘Set of Ideas’ in Annex C) as a basis for discussion. 
However, it insisted upon the greatest possible readjustment to reflect as 
much as possible the distribution of population and land ownership. It has 
also been suggested that central Nicosia and Famagusta (with Varosha) 
could be areas with bilingual status (see Table 1). 
The territorial readjustment between the two communities is clearly a 
matter between the two Cypriot communities alone, assisted by the UN if 
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and when needed. Resettlement considerations would no doubt take 
precedence over purely economic ones. In the 1992 negotiations, the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the UN map on the grounds that it 
would cause the displacement of over 37,000 people.  
It seems quite likely that the majority of Turkish Cypriots living in the 
land that could become part of the southern constituent state might wish 
to relocate north. The territorial adjustments should be finely tuned so as 
to minimise the relocation of families. Territorial readjustments would 
also aim, however, to allow the greatest possible number of refugees to 
return to their homes, if they so wished. In practice, there is inevitably 
going to be an interdependence between the terms of territorial 
adjustments and refugee return. Given the importance attached by the 
Greek Cypriot leadership and community to the implementation of the 
right of return, and the insistence of the Turkish Cypriot community that 
northern Cyprus should remain predominantly Turkish Cypriot at least in 
the short/medium term, some territorial adjustments would be a way to 
satisfy both needs. 
What may facilitate an agreement upon a map which would allow as 
many Greek Cypriots to return to their homes as possible (if they so 
wished) and as few as possible Turkish Cypriots to relocate further north 
(if they so wished) would be the fact that the constituent state border 
would not be a border between two independent states. As such, the 
parties may agree upon a relatively ‘complicated’ map, separating the two 
constituent states, allowing for example Lefka (as a traditional Turkish 
Cypriot village) to remain in the northern constituent state, while territory 
in the Morphou area to be transferred to the southern constituent state.  
4.2   Refugees 
The following basic principles were worked out in the ‘Set of Ideas’ of 
1992:  
For Turkish Cypriots who currently live in areas to be given back to 
southern Cyprus, and Greek Cypriots who own properties there: 
•  Turkish Cypriots who were already there before 1974  
-  Either remain in their property 
-  Or receive a comparable residence in northern Cyprus. 
•  Turkish Cypriots who came as refugees from 1963 and 1974 
-  Either receive a comparable residence in the same area, 
-  Return to their former residence, EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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-  Or receive comparable residence in northern Cyprus. 
•  Greek Cypriots who owned properties in those areas before 
1974 
-  Would be able to return to their properties. 
For refugees from other areas in southern and northern Cyprus: 
•  Those wishing to return 
-  These people would re-occupy their properties, and the 
present occupants would be relocated, unless the present 
occupant was also a displaced person, the building had 
been substantially altered, or been converted for public 
use, etc., i n which case they join those receiving 
compensation. 
•  Those wishing to receive compensation 
-  The value of their claims would be worked out by the 
special agency. 
We now consider how these ideas might be applied, also having in mind 
some more recent developments. While the general rights of all refugees 
would be identical, the implementation of their rights could depend on 
when the displaced persons left their properties and  where  those 
properties were located. 
The territorial re-adjustments would lead to some voluntary re-location of 
Turkish Cypriots. This would allow a number of Greek Cypriot refugees 
(between one-half and two-thirds of their total, depending on the 
magnitude of the readjustment) to return to their former homes if they so 
wished. 
Regarding both Greek and Turkish Cypriot refugees whose property 
would remain in the constituent state administered by the ‘other’ 
community, the ‘Set of Ideas’ elaborated a complex formula including 
return, exchange and compensation so as to satisfy the needs of both 
communities. Effectively those refugees would have the option of return, 
individual exchange of properties, or compensation.  
Probably a relatively low percentage of refugees would choose to return 
to live in the constituent state not administered by their own community. 
These would probably include a very low number of Turkish Cypriot 
refugees and a relatively higher percentage of Greek Cypriot refugees. 
The constituent state authorities governing the region where the 
properties were located would process the individual demands for return. TERRITORY, REFUGEES AND SECURITY 
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The returnees would only be denied access to their original properties 
(and receive compensation or equivalent accommodation) under specific 
conditions. For example persons on record as having been involved in 
inter-communal violence might be denied access to property in the 
constituent state administered by the ‘other community’.  
In practice, many refugees would probably voluntarily opt for 
compensation or individual exchange. Compensation claims would be 
filed by the original owners (or heirs) of the properties within a set period 
following an agreement. The value of the claims would be calculated on 
the basis of the value of the property at the time of departure plus 
inflation. According to the ‘Set of Ideas’, separate agencies would be set 
up by the constituent states to administer compensation funds. The funds 
of the agencies would come both from within and from outside the island. 
One source of internal funding would be the sale of those properties 
owned by refugees who would choose not to return. The northern agency 
would be in charge of the sales of the properties belonging to Greek 
Cypriot refugees and vice versa for the southern agency. The respective 
funds from the sales of the properties would then be exchanged between 
the two agencies on a ‘global communal basis’. Additional funds could 
be transferred to the constituent state agencies from the budgets of the 
common and constituent states.  
In addition, external funding would be envisaged. In the past the US and 
Canada hinted that they would be willing to contribute a considerable 
sum for compensation. The EU and its member states (particularly the 
UK) would also be likely to contribute funds. 
Since 1992, however, when the UN proposals were drawn up, the 
Loizidou case at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1996 
has introduced a new element.
30 Even if the two communities were to 
                                                 
30 In March 1989, the Greek Cypriot Titina Loizidou attempted to cross the 
‘green line’ in order to reach her property i n Kyrenia and was stopped by 
Turkish forces. In July Ms Loizidou filed a complaint to the European Court of 
Human Rights (no. 15318/89). The Court’s rulings on the Loizidou case came in 
different stages. On 23 March 1995, the Court first accepted the premise that in 
the light of the ongoing conflict and the presence of Turkish forces in northern 
Cyprus, Turkey’s jurisdiction was considered to extend to the northern part of 
the island. In its second ruling on 18 December 1996, the Court found Turkey 
guilty of violating Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms guaranteeing Ms. 
Loizidou’s ‘peaceful enjoyment of her possessions’. Finally on 28 July 1998, the 
ECHR requested a compensation of €800,000 from Turkey to Ms. Loizidou for 
denying the enjoyment of her property in Kyrenia. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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agree upon a system of property exchange, there might be continuing 
challenges by any Cypriot individual deprived of his/her property by 
appealing to the ECHR. Following the Loizidou precedent there are 
currently around 150-200 individual Greek Cypriot cases filed against 
Turkey pending in the ECHR. Current negotiators are no doubt 
determined to leave no unresolved questions in any future package deal 
and are likely to work for solutions that would be least vulnerable to 
international law. Although the end result in terms of the numbers of 
returned refugees may remain unchanged, the Loizidou case has 
transformed the nature of the debate on these questions.  
The Loizidou case, and further cases likely to follow this precedent, will 
no doubt be taken into account by current negotiators. However, in the 
event of agreement between the two communities, ratified in agreements 
and constitutional acts with the highest legal standing, international law 
in practice would surely heed its content. Although individual Cypriots 
would have the right to file complaints at the ECHR if they felt their 
property was being unjustly denied, it is unlikely that such cases would 
cause the entire agreement to collapse.  
4.3 Security guarantees 
Consideration would have to be given to revising the 1959 Treaty of 
Guarantee, which spelt out the roles of the three guarantor powers 
(Greece, Turkey and the UK) in the affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Article 4 of the Treaty allowed for the possibility, in the event of a 
breakdown of the Republic’s constitutional order and if the guarantors 
failed to mobilise a multilateral response, of unilateral rights of 
intervention by any of the three guarantors. Since the signing of the 1959 
Treaty, all three guarantors of the Republic infringed the Treaty by their 
actions or inactions. While a strong guarantee of the new constitutional 
order would seem called for, the 1959 Treaty in its original form would 
surely need amendment if not replacement.  
Under a fresh or revised treaty the future common state of Cyprus might 
be guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and the European Union. The three 
parties would guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the 
new state, ensure it against any unilateral change of the new 
constitutional order by either community, and safeguard the principles of 
the European Union throughout the island. If a new situation called for a 
reaction by the guarantors, there would be a presumption of first recourse 
to the EU for non-military intervention. The EU already has instruments 
at its disposal, to which the new Cyprus treaty could refer. In the event of 
a breach of the constitutional order, or a violation  of the principles of TERRITORY, REFUGEES AND SECURITY 
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‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the rule of law’ (Article 6.1 of the TEU), ‘the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain rights deriving from the 
application of the Treaty’ (Article 7.3 of the Treaty of Nice, ex-article 7). 
In other words, Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty of the European Union 
would be integrated into the new Treaty of Guarantee allowing for a first 
non-military EU guarantorship both of the constitutional order and of the 
respect for the principles of the Union in Cyprus.  
A non-military EU guarantee alone, however, may be considered 
insufficient. Indeed the leaderships of both Cypriot communities have 
accepted the continuation of the military guarantees of the 1959 Treaty.
31 
In particular, the Turkish Cypriot community, still distrustful of the 
European Union, may consider that for last resort a hard Turkish 
guarantee was essential. The revised Treaty could thus retain the separate 
guarantees of Greece and Turkey in the event of a constitutional 
breakdown and a failure of the EU non-military guarantee to rectify the 
situation.  
Adding the EU as a guarantor to the new state would serve two main 
purposes. First it would increase the credibility of the Treaty, given the 
strong deterrent force of possible EU sanctions. Second the inclusion of a 
‘first-stop’ EU guarantee would reassure the Greek Cypriot community. 
In the hypothetical situation of a constitutional breakdown or an 
infringement of rights caused by the Greek Cypriot community, a Turkish 
intervention would only follow after the failure of warning and sanctions 
of the EU intended to rectify the situation. The disincentives on the Greek 
as well as Turkish Cypriot communities to infringe rights and agreements 
would be such that it would thus be virtually impossible to envisage 
repetition of the July-August 1974 scenario.  
4.4 Peacekeeping 
In addition to these guarantees, the new Cyprus common state would 
presumably also require peacekeeping forces for a transitional period of 
some years. The structure of the peacekeeping force could evolve over 
time. There would initially be separate Greek, Turkish and international 
                                                 
31 The continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee’s provisions for unilateral 
intervention were always demanded by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which 
has always claimed that on last resort it would only trust Turkey to guarantee the 
security of the Turkish Cypriot community. In a recent interview with Mehmet 
Ali Birand published by CNN Turk (November 2001), President Clerides also 
stated that the Greek Cypriot side could accept a continuation of Turkish (as well 
as British and Greek) guarantorship. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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contingents on the island. Adopting a revised version of the 1959 Treaty 
of Alliance, Greek and Turkish contingents would only have access to the 
southern and northern constituent states, respectively. The international 
force would be able to freely circulate throughout the island. In an initial 
period the three forces would probably remain under separate command. 
After a certain period, following the scaling down of Greek and Turkish 
contingents, there might be a single, unified international command 
structure. The force would remain on the island until the constituent 
states found it no longer necessary. 
It may be discussed whether the peacekeeping force should be under UN, 
NATO or EU flags. A continued UN role would have the advantage of 
continuity. NATO on the other hand has both Greece and Turkey on 
strictly equal footing in all policy-making decisions. The EU and NATO 
are learning to work more closely together, and the present Cyprus issue 
might be a good case in point for constructive collaboration. To give 
further assurances of even-handedness, a non-EU NATO member state 
might be entrusted with leadership of the NATO peacekeeping force 
(Norway, for example, has excellent credentials for such a role).  
However, if the EU had a place in the treaty of guarantee for non-military 
intervention, for which there are solid arguments, there could be a case 
also for the EU’s Rapid Reaction Capability to take on the military 
peacekeeping role. On the other hand, Turkey would feel that it did not 
have a fully equal status alongside other EU member states, including 
Greece, as it would do in NATO.  
Nonetheless, an EU security arrangement including Turkey could actually 
provide a channel to partly resolve the still open question of Turkey’s 
role in ESDP. The current understanding between Turkey, the UK and the 
US would be to exclude Cyprus (as well as the Aegean) from the reach of 
the Rapid Reaction Force. But this understanding has not yet been agreed 
in the context of the EU, and Greece in particular has raised objections to 
this arrangement. A possible modification to the agreement as far as 
Cyprus was concerned could be to include Turkey fully in a Rapid 
Reaction Force presence in Cyprus. So rather than excluding Cyprus from 
ESDP, Turkey’s concerns about an EU security role in Cyprus could be 
met by its full inclusion in this particular EU operation. The legal basis 
for this full inclusion, compared to other possible theatres of operation of 
the Rapid Reaction Force, would be Turkey’s rights deriving from the 
Treaty of Guarantee. Such an arrangement could serve the double 
purpose of assuring Cyprus’ security as well as resolving the remaining 
question of Turkey’s role in ESDP in a manner that would draw Turkey 
increasingly into the EU orbit.  TERRITORY, REFUGEES AND SECURITY 
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The peacekeeping force might be responsible for three primary functions. 
First, together with the Greek and Turkish forces in southern and northern 
Cyprus it would monitor the situation on the ground, preventing any 
inter-communal clashes particularly in identified potential ‘hotspots’ 
throughout the island. The force would investigate any development, 
which in the view of either the Greek Cypriot, the Turkish Cypriot or the 
other two guarantor powers, were deemed a threat to the security of either 
the constituent states or the common state. Second, it would monitor the 
disarmament of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot military and para-
military forces. Third, the international force would supervise and verify 
the gradual reduction of Turkish and Greek forces on the island to equal 
numbers of soldiers and given quantities of equipment within a given 
number of months after the entry into force of the new constitution. Upon 
agreement of the two constituent states, Greek and Turkish forces could 
be further reduced with time. 
Following the UN texts of 1979 and 1992, the common state of Cyprus 
would be a de-militarised island, apart from the international force (and 
the UK sovereign bases at Dhekelia and Akrotiri). The National Guard 
and the Turkish Cypriot Defence Forces and all para-military forces 
would be dissolved during the transition period. The Joint Defence 
Doctrine b etween the Republic of Cyprus and Greece would be 
rescinded, as for all defence agreements between Turkey and the present 
TRNC.  
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CHAPTER 5 
PREPARING FOR ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) opened negotiations with the European 
Union on the 30 March 1998. At the time of writing, 24 out of 31 
chapters have been provisionally closed. These include important sectors 
such as the four freedoms, EMU and justice and home affairs. The 
Commission expects to conclude the remaining chapters (competition, 
agriculture, taxation, regional policy and financial/budgetary provisions) 
by the summer of 2002. In the meantime the Commission will be also 
carrying out preparatory work for the drafting of Cyprus’ Accession 
Treaty. This would allow the Accession Treaty to be signed in early 
2003, and ratified by the European Parliament and 15 national 
parliaments in the course of 2003 and 2004, in order for Cyprus to 
become a full-fledged EU member state by 2004. The Turkish Cypriot 
authorities have not so far been part of this process. In the event of a 
political settlement to re-unify the island within the EU, the question 
would be how to integrate the Turkish Cypriots within the accession 
process as quickly and effectively as possible. This of course depends 
primarily on the timing of a settlement itself.  
By far the best option would be for the terms of a settlement (which 
would itself be conditional upon EU membership) to be taken into 
account in the Accession Treaty. This could be possible if the two 
communities reached an agreement before the end of 2002. It would also 
provide the highest assurance to the Turkish Cypriot community that the 
arrangements agreed to with the EU to account for Turkish Cypriot 
concerns would not be vulnerable to adverse ECJ rulings (if for example 
specific deviations from the acquis were included in Cyprus’ Accession 
Treaty, they would have the highest legal rank and thus be the least 
vulnerable to challenges from the ECJ). 
If an agreement is in sight but could not be finalised before the end of the 
year, the Accession Treaty might be signed with the RoC, and a separate 
Protocol agreed with the Turkish Cypriot authorities following an 
agreement. The Accession Treaty would include provisions allowing for 
revisions that would follow from a settlement. The separate protocol 
affecting the northern part of the island would not require separate 
ratification by the EU. In this case, a settlement would need to be agreed 
during 2003.  
The worst-case scenario would be if talks failed to reach an agreement 
prior to the accession of the RoC in 2004. Should this scenario 
materialise, the Union has repeatedly declared that the Accession Treaty PREPARING FOR ACCESSION TO THE EU 
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could be signed with the RoC, and that legally it would be deemed to 
represent the entire island, but implementation of EU legislation would be 
confined exclusively to the south. There has been much speculation about 
the adverse consequences of such an arrangement, to which we do not 
add here.  
Returning to the first best option, i.e. agreement is reached before the 
Accession Treaty is finalised and ratified, the question is how this can be 
done. An option might be for the EU to mark a fresh start after closing 
chapter 29 with the present negotiation partner. The final two chapters are 
called ‘institutions’ and ‘other’. These general chapters include questions 
such as the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of the Union. Chapters 
30 and 31 would in any case be the starting points for the Turkish Cypriot 
community’s integration into the EU. Compliance with t he EU 
Copenhagen criteria is a prerequisite of EU membership. These two final 
chapters could therefore be negotiated by the two communities and the 
EU and would be fully integrated into the Accession Treaty.  
It would also be highly desirable for the Commission to establish regular 
contact with the Turkish Cypriot authorities as early as possible in order 
for the former to inform the latter about the opportunities, obligations and 
possible transition periods/derogations to the acquis, as well as for the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities to voice their positions and concerns to the 
Union. A number of accession chapters, already provisionally closed with 
the Greek Cypriot negotiating team, would need to be revised. These may 
include chapters affecting the internal market, justice and home affairs, 
regional policy and structural funds to name a few.  
The mode of inclusion inevitably runs into the thorny question of 
recognition. At present the only contacts are through information 
missions by officials of the EU Commission, with meetings conducted in 
non-official venues (universities, chambers of commerce, etc.). If there 
were a settlement in the next few months the problem would be 
automatically resolved. Contact between Turkish Cypriot officials and the 
EU would be established on the basis of the new status of the Turkish 
Cypriot community within the re-unified island. But it is more likely that 
if a settlement were reached, this would occur during or after the summer. 
The EU’s current position is that it cannot establish official relations with 
the Turkish Cypriot authorities as this would be tantamount to 
recognition of the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriots instead claim that they 
would accept official contacts with the Union provided these were not 
subordinated to the Union’s relations with the RoC. However, the amount 
of catch-up northern Cyprus would have to make in order to be integrated EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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into the Union is considerable. There is therefore little time available 
given the forthcoming expiry of the accession timetable.  
A way of overcoming the recognition problem might be to establish 
relations with Turkish Cypriot officials as representatives of the ‘future 
common state of Cyprus’. Provided the two community leaders felt that 
negotiations were progressing, the Union could establish relations with 
Turkish Cypriot officials on the grounds of their future status within a 
new partnership. In the same way that the Greek Cypriot authorities are 
currently negotiating with Turkish Cypriot officials without recognising 
the TRNC, the same could occur between the Turkish Cypriots and the 
Union.
32 The US recently hosted a reception in its premises in northern 
Cyprus, without recognising the TRNC. It presented this move as a 
gesture of encouragement towards peace. Regular contact between the 
EU and the Turkish Cypriot officials should be opened now without 
delay, to avoid precious time being wasted, and facilitate the fastest 
possible integration of northern Cyprus into the Union. It would also add 
an important momentum to the inter-communal  negotiations currently 
going on, significantly raising the prospects of the entry of a reunified 
Cyprus into the EU by 2004.  
Even if the first best scenario providing for the incorporation of a 
settlement into the Accession Treaty were possible, the implementation 
of many EU laws and regulations in northern Cyprus would require 
longer transition periods. Northern Cyprus could benefit from a pre-
accession strategy beginning in early 2003. The objective would be the 
modernisation and catch-up of northern Cyprus.  
                                                 
32 Within the Greek Cypriot community there is also a growing debate 
concerning how trade between the two sides could be resumed. A recent draft 
report of the Council of Europe (24 January 2002) also suggested that the Union 
should resume its de facto trade with northern Cyprus, blocked after the 1994 
ECJ decision.    
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ANNEXES 
Annex A – Notes on the Cyprus economy 
While there is no shortage of analysis about the economy of southern 
Cyprus, the north is less well known. The following therefore summarises 
the main comparative indicators between north and south, and goes on to 
describe in a little more detail the state of the northern economy, with 
basic statistics given in Tables A.1-A.3. 
The great difference in GDP between north and south of 8.5:1 is made up 
of a population imbalance is about 3.5:1 (669,000 in the south, 209,000 in 
the north) and a GDP per capita imbalance of about 2.8:1. The GDP per 
capital figures for 2000 place the south ($13,272) at 64% of the EU 
average, above Portugal and Greece. The north ($4,978), at 29% of the 
EU average, is within the range of EU accession candidate states, and 
significantly higher than for Turkey ($3,200). (The above figures are at 
market exchange rates. In terms of exchange rates in purchasing power 
parity (PPP), the differences are greatly reduced, and the south reaches 
83% of the EU average. For the north PPP figures are not available).  
The monetary and p ublic finance indicators for the south are relatively 
close to the Maastricht criteria (inflation rate 4% in 2000, and budget 
deficit of 2.7%GDP). The north, which is part of the Turkish Lira area, 
has had an inflation rate of around 50% for many years, and in 2000 had 
a budget deficit of 6.6% of GDP (but without grants from Turkey the 
shortfall in budget revenues was 23% of GDP – see further below).   
Both north and south are heavily dependent on tourism, but this is more 
marked in the north, at least partly due to the trade embargo by the EU. 
As a result exports of goods account for only 13% of imports for the 
north, whereas the ratio is 28% for the south. 
The north has good economic potential. The Kyrenia coast line and the 
Karpasia peninsula are areas of outstanding natural beauty, and have 
avoided the over-rapid hotel and real estate development that has 
disfigured large stretches of the south-eastern coast line. The scope for a 
well-controlled expansion in the future is obvious, just awaiting 
favourable political conditions. The road infrastructure of the north is of 
generally good quality, and some notable highway investments have been 
made in recent years. Also some large investments in the international 
university sector have been made, notably at the Eastern Mediterranean 
University at Famagusta, which teaches entirely in English. ANNEXES 
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The north has suffered the seriously adverse consequences of the Turkish 
financial crisis of 2000, and has been in recession in 2000 and 2001, 
whereas the south has sustained a rapid rate of economic growth. The 
recession in the north has intensified the serious structural weaknesses of 
the economy. Five northern Cyprus banks in 2000, including the biggest 
one, collapsed. Many people lost banked savings. Subsequent to the large 
devaluation of the Turkish lire, and increased inflation unmatched by pay 
increases, real income levels suffered a very serious decline. Figures for 
2001 are not yet available, but anecdotal evidence suggests 50% cuts in 
real incomes of public servants. The bank crisis also meant the drying up 
of credit for the private sector, further reducing investment. Production 
from the notable citrus fruit sector has stagnated over the last 20 years, 
and in 2000 was hit by bad luck, with a poor crop for climatic reasons. 
The tourism sector has continued to grow, with notable inflows of capital 
into secondary residences by the London community of emigrated 
Turkish Cypriots as well as British, German and other Europeans. 
However this building boom of 1996-99 in real estate has had little effect 
on the rest of the economy, and the manufacturing sector is very 
depressed, suffering of course from the trade embargo.  
On the other hand the public sector has continuously grown, with public 
expenditure now reaching 51% of GDP, compared to 28% in 1989. Yet 
public revenues have stagnated at about 28% GDP. All categories of 
public expenditure have grown as a share of GDP, but the largest element 
has been the growth of social welfare payments. There has emerged 
therefore over the  last decade a huge increase in the financing 
requirement of the state budget, which has been met almost wholly by 
grants and loans from Turkey: these transfers reached 23% of northern 
Cyprus’ GDP in 2000. The basic data on the public finances of northern 
Cyprus point to an increasingly aid-dependent and ultimately 
unsustainable picture. 
These figures exclude the cost of the Turkish military presence. Whereas 
total civilian employment in the northern Cyprus economy amounts to 
89,000 persons, the number of Turkish military personnel is reputed to be 
in the range of 35-45,000, thus between 40 to 50% of domestic 
employment. If the cost of the military were consolidated into the public 
finances of northern Cyprus, total public expenditure would probably 
amount to about two-thirds of GDP.  
The financial aid by Turkey to northern Cyprus is partly indicated in the 
state budget. In 2000 grants and loans amounted to 150 billion Turkish 
lire, or about $250 million at the current exchange rate. Turkey also helps 
to finance parts of the social security system that lie outside the budget, EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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and in addition there is the cost of the military. Overall the total in 2000 
might have amounted to about $400 million. 
     Table A1. Cyprus, main economic indicators, 2000 
                 
South 
      
  North 
 
GNP, $ millions     8,879    1,040   
GNP growth, %    5.1    -0.6   
GNP per capita, $    13,272    4,978   
             
Inflation, %    4.1    53.1   
Budget deficit, % GNP  2.0    6.6   
             
Exports, $ million    843    50   
Imports, $ million    3,564    425   
Tourist revenue, $ million  1,880    198   
             
Population, thousands  669    209   
Population growth, %    0.6    1.1   
             
Source:   Department of Statistics of the Republic of Cyprus, and State Planning 
Organisation of TRNC.  ANNEXES 
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Table A2. Budget revenues and expenditure of Northern Cyprus, 2000, % 
GDP 
   1990-94    1995-99    2000 
               
Tax revenues   19.3    19.6    19.4 
   Direct taxes   10.5    11.2    11.4 
   Indirect taxes   8.9    8.3    8.0 
Other income   4.1    5.1    5.8 
Fund revenues   1.0    1.8    2.8 
Total Revenues     24.6    26.5    28.0 
           
Current expenditures  17.0    17.5    19.9 
Social and other transfers  13.1    16.9    21.9 
Defence     1.8    3.6    3.7 
Investments   4.2    4.5    5.5 
Total Expenditures     36.2    47.2    51.0 
            
Budget deficit   11.3    16.0    23.0 
Financed by:            
Foreign aid (Turkish)   4.0    10.3    16.4 
Loans     7.5    5.7    6.6 
Source:   TRNC State Planning Organisation, Economic and Social Indicators, January 
2002. 
Table A3. Sectoral composition and growth of Northern Cyprus GDP 
     
 
 
  % growth        % 
share 
GDP 
 
       1990-99  2000  2001    2000   
Agriculture     3.4  -13.2  ..    7.9   
Industry       1.9  4.0  ..    12.2   
Construction     5.9  18.7  ..    9.3   
Transport-communications    6.4  6.7  ..    12.3   
Trade-tourism     4.9  -5.4  ..    16.4   
Financial institutions    7.1  -6.8  ..    5.9   
Rent from dwellings    2.0  2.2  ..    5.1   
Business and personal services  16.2  -10.7  ..    7.8   
Public services     2.0  3.1  ..    16.4   
                  
Total       3.5  -0.6  -3.6    100   
Source:   TRNC State Planning Organisation, Economic and Social Indicators, January 
2002.EMERSON AND TOCCI 
78   
 
Annex B 
UN High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 
Agreement of the 12 February 1977 between Makarios III and Rauf Denktas 
under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim  
(a)  We are seeking an independent, non-aligned and bi-communal Federal 
Republic. 
(b)  The territory under the administration of each community should be 
discussed in the light of the economic viability or productivity and land 
ownership.  
(c)  Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, 
the right to property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, 
taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal 
system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish 
Cypriot community. 
(d)  The powers and function of the central federal government will be such as to 
safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal 
character of the state. 
Agreement of the 19 May 1979 between Spyros Kyprianou and Rauf Denktas 
under the auspices of UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim  
(a)  It was agreed to resume inter-communal talks on 15 June 1979. 
(b)  The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktas guidelines of 12 
February 1977 and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.  
(c)  There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all 
the citizens of the Republic. 
(d)  The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.  
(e)  Priority will be given to reaching an agreement of the resettlement of 
Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the 
consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects 
of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been 
reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the 
discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.  
(f)  It will be agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardise the 
outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical 
measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the 
return to normal conditions.  
(g)  The demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged and matters 
relating thereto will be discussed.  ANNEXES 
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(h)  The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the 
Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part 
with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.  
(i)  The inter-communal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained 
manner, avoiding any delay. 
(j)  The inter-communal talks will take place in Nicosia.  EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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Annex C 
 ‘Set of Ideas’ on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus 
(Text of UN Secretary General Boutras-Boutras Ghali adopted in UN Resolution 
750 on 10 April 1992) 
1. The leader of the Greek Cypriot community and the leader of the Turkish 
Cypriot community have negotiated on an equal footing, under the auspices of 
the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General, the following overall 
framework agreement on Cyprus which constitutes a major step towards a just 
and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question. The overall framework agreement 
will be submitted to the two communities in separate referendums within thirty 
days of its completion by the two leaders at a high-level international meeting. 
I. OVERALL OBJECTIVES 
2. The overall framework agreement is an integrated whole which, when it is 
approved by both communities in separate referendums and the provisions 
contained in the transitional arrangements have been implemented, will result in 
a new partnership and a new constitution for Cyprus that will govern the 
relations of the two communities on a federal basis that is bi-communal as 
regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects. 
The overall framework agreement is based on the 1977 and 1979 high-level 
agreements, relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council 
resolutions 367 (1975), 649 (1990), 716 (1991) and 750 (1992), and the guiding 
principles set out below. 
3. The overall framework agreement recognizes that Cyprus is the common 
home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community 
and that their relationship is not one of majority and minority but one of two 
communities in the federal republic of Cyprus. It safeguards the cultural, 
religious, political, social and linguistic identity of each community. 
4. The overall framework agreement ensures that the Cyprus settlement is based 
on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a 
single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and 
comprising two politically equal communities as defined in paragraph 11 of the 
Secretary General's report of 3 April 1992 (S/23780) in a bi-communal and bi-
zonal federation, and that the settlement must exclude union in whole or in part 
with any other country or any form of partition or secession. 
5. The overall framework agreement acknowledges and ensures the political 
equality of the two communities. While political equality does not mean equal 
numerical participation in all branches and administration of the federal 
government, it will be reflected in the fact that the approval and amendment of 
the federal constitution will require the approval of both communities; in the 
effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions of the 
federal government; in safeguards to ensure that the federal government will not ANNEXES 
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be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community; 
and in the equality and identical powers and functions of the two federated 
states. 
6. The overall framework agreement provides for functions and powers of the 
federal government, including its structure, composition and functioning of its 
three branches, that will ensure the effective participation of the two 
communities and the effective functioning of the federal government, which will 
require an appropriate deadlock-resolving machinery. 
7. The two communities acknowledge each other's identity and integrity, and 
commit themselves to work actively to achieve a new relationship based on 
mutual respect, friendship and co-operation. Toward this end, the two 
communities agree to change all practices incompatible with this commitment 
and to refrain from any action which would impair the efforts for a negotiated 
settlement. They pledge to launch immediately a programme of action to 
promote goodwill and closer relations between them (see appendix). 
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
8. The bi-communal and bi-zonal federation will be established freely by the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. All powers not vested by them 
in the federal government will rest with the two federated states. 
9. The federal constitution will come into force after its approval by the two 
communities in separate referendums and can only be amended with the 
approval of both federated states. 
10. The federal republic will be one territory composed of two politically equal 
federated states. 
11. The federal republic will have one sovereignty which is indivisible and 
which emanates equally from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities. One community cannot claim sovereignty over the other 
community. The federal republic will have one international personality and one 
citizenship regulated by federal law in accordance with the federal constitution. 
12. The federal constitution will safeguard the identity, integrity and security of 
each community as well as their political, economic, social, cultural, linguistic 
and religious rights. All citizens will be equal under the law. 
13. The federal republic will be secular. Religious functionaries will be 
prohibited from holding elected or appointed political office in the federal 
government or in the federated states. 
14. The federal republic will maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and 
Turkey and will accord most favoured nation treatment to Greece and Turkey in 
connection with all agreements whatever their nature. The federal republic will 
continue the membership in the Commonwealth. 
15. The official languages of the federal republic will be Greek and Turkish. The 
English language may also be used. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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16. The federal republic will have its own flag to be agreed upon. The federal 
flag will be flown on federal buildings and federal locations to the exclusion of 
all other flags. Each federated state will have its own flag. 
17. The holidays to be observed by the federal government will be agreed upon 
and embodied in the federal constitution. Each federated state will observe the 
federal holidays as well as those established by it. 
18. The two federated states will have identical powers and functions. 
19. Each federated state will be administered by one community. 
20. Each federated state will decide on its own governmental arrangement in a 
manner consistent with the federal constitution. 
21. The federal Government cannot encroach upon the powers and functions of 
the two federated states. 
22. Security, law and order and the administration of justice in its territory will 
be the responsibility of each federated state in a manner consistent with the 
federal constitution. 
23. The two federated states will cooperate in the preservation and / or use of 
historical sites and religious shrines of both faiths to be agreed to during the 
transitional period. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE FEDERATION 
24. The powers, functions and structure of the federal Government will be in 
conformity with the overall objectives and guiding principles set out above. 
A. Powers and functions to be vested in the federal Government 
25. The federal Government will have the powers and functions listed below. All 
powers and functions not vested in the federal Government will rest with the two 
federated states. The federated states may decide jointly to confer additional 
powers and functions to the federal Government or to transfer powers and 
functions from the federal Government to the federated states. 
26. The federal Government will have the following powers and functions: 
(a) Foreign affairs (the federated states may enter into agreements with foreign 
Governments and international organizations in their areas of competence. The 
representation in foreign affairs will reflect the bi-communal nature of the 
federal republic); 
(b) Central bank functions (including the issuance of currency); 
(c) Customs and the coordination of international trade; 
(d) Airports and ports as concerns international matters; 
(e) Federal budget and federal taxation; 
(f) Immigration and citizenship; ANNEXES 
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(g) Defense (to be discussed also in connection with the Treaties of Guarantee 
and of Alliance); 
(h) Federal judiciary and federal police; 
(i) Federal postal and telecommunications services; 
(j) Patents and trademarks; 
(k) Appointment of federal officials and civil servants (on a 70:30 Greek 
Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot ratio); 
(l) Standard setting for public health, environment, use and preservation of 
natural resources, and weights and measures; 
(m) Coordination of tourism and industrial activities. 
27. The federal powers and functions will be executed by the federal 
Government or, in accordance with agreements, through delegation to the 
federated states. 
B. STRUCTURE, COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
1. The Legislature 
28. The legislature will be composed of a lower house and an upper house. The 
presidents of the lower house and of the upper house cannot come from the same 
community. The president and vice-president of each house will not come from 
the same community. 
29. All laws must be approved by both houses. 
The lower house will be bi-communal with a 70:30 Greek Cypriot / Turkish 
Cypriot ratio. 
31. The upper house will have a 50:50 ratio representing the two federated states. 
32. All laws will be adopted by majority in each house. A majority of the Greek 
Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot representatives in the lower house may decide, on 
matters related to foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration 
and citizenship, that the adoption of a law in the lower house will require 
separate majorities of the representatives of both communities. 
33. Separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot majorities will be required to 
constitute a quorum in each house. If a quorum is not attained in either house on 
two consecutive meetings because of the absence of a majority of one or both 
communities, the president of the relevant house will call a meeting in no less 
than five days and no more than ten days. At that meeting, a majority of the 
upper house will constitute a quorum. In the lower house, 30% of the total 
membership will constitute a quorum. 
34. If the two houses fail to adopt a bill or decision, they will initiate proceedings 
to obtain a consensus while ensuring the continued functioning of the federal EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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government. To this end, a conference committee will be established. The 
conference committee will be composed of two persons each selected by the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot groups equally from among the members of 
the two houses of the federal legislature. The text of the legislation or decision 
agreed to by the conference committee will be submitted to both houses for 
approval. 
35. In the event the federal budget is not adopted in one or both houses and until 
an agreement is reached by the conference committee and is adopted by both 
houses, the provisions of the most recent federal budget plus inflation shall 
remain in effect. 
2. The Executive 
36. The federal executive will consist of a federal president, a federal vice-
president, and a federal council of ministers. The president and the vice president 
will symbolize the unity of the country and the political equality of the two 
communities. 
(On the question of the election of the president and vice-president, the two sides 
have expressed different positions. The Greek Cypriot side prefers a system 
under which the president is elected by popular universal suffrage. The Turkish 
Cypriot side prefers a system under which the president rotates between the two 
communities). 
37. To facilitate the effective launching of the federal government and for the 
initial eight years, the president and vice-president will also be the heads of their 
respective federated states. 
38. There will be a council of ministers composed of Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot ministers on a 7:3 ratio. The president and vice-president will designate 
the ministers from their respective communities who will appoint them by an 
instrument signed by them both. One of the following three ministries, that is 
foreign affairs, finance, or defence, will be allocated to a Turkish Cypriot 
minister. The president and the foreign minister will not come from the same 
community. 
39. The president and the vice-president will discuss the preparation of the 
agenda of the council of ministers and each can include items in the agenda. 
40. Decisions of the council of ministers will be taken by majority vote. 
However, decisions of the council of ministers concerning foreign affairs, 
defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship will require the 
concurrence of both the president and the vice-president. 
41. Arrangements related to the implementation of foreign policy and the 
composition of the foreign service will be set out in the federal constitution. 
42. The president and the vice-president will, separately or conjointly, have the 
right to veto any law or decision of the legislature concerning foreign affairs, 
defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship. The president 
and vice-president will have the right, separately or conjointly, to return any law ANNEXES 
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or decision of the legislature or any decision of the council of ministers for 
reconsideration. 
3. The Judiciary 
43. The federal judiciary will consist of a supreme court composed of an equal 
number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges appointed jointly by the 
president and vice-president with the consent of the upper house. The supreme 
court will sit as the federal constitutional court and the highest court of the 
federation. Its presidency will rotate between the senior Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot members of the supreme court. Lower federal courts may be 
established in each federated state. 
44. The supreme court will deal with matters arising  under the federal 
constitution and federal laws, and will be empowered to fulfil other judiciary 
functions related to federal matters attributed to it by the federal constitution or 
federal legislation. 
45. Each federated state will have its own judiciary to deal with matters not 
attributed to the federal judiciary by the federal constitution. 
46. The federal constitution will establish the procedure for ascertaining the 
constitutionality of federal laws and executive acts, as well as adequate 
machinery of judicial review to ensure the compliance of legislative, executive, 
and judicial acts of the federated states with the federal constitution. 
C. Fundamental rights, including the three freedoms, and political, economic, 
social, and cultural rights 
47. All universally recognised fundamental rights and freedoms will be included 
in the federal constitution. 
48. The freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the right to 
property will be safeguarded in the federal constitution. The implementation of 
these rights will take into account the 1977 high-level agreement and the guiding 
principles set out above. 
49. The freedom of movement will be exercised without any restrictions as soon 
as the federal republic is established, subject only to non-discriminatory normal 
police functions. 
50. The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented 
after the resettlement process arising from the territorial adjustments has been 
completed. The federated states will regulate these rights in a manner to be 
agreed upon during the transitional period consistent with the federal 
constitution. 
51. Persons who are known to have been or are actively involved in acts of 
violence or in incitement to violence and/or hatred against persons of the other 
community may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from going to the 
federated state administered by the other community. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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IV. SECURITY AND GUARANTEE 
52. The security of the federal republic and of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot federated states will be guaranteed. 
53. The demilitarization of the federal republic remains an objective. 
54. The 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance continue in force and will be 
supplemented in a document to be appended as set out below. 
55. The Treaty of Guarantee will ensure the independence and territorial 
integrity of the federal republic and exclude union in whole or in part with any 
other country and any form of partition or secession; ensure the security of the 
Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot federated states; and ensure against the 
unilateral change of the new constitutional order of the federal republic by either 
community. 
56. A numerical balance of Greek and Greek Cypriot troops and equipment on 
the one hand and of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot troops and equipment on the 
other hand will be achieved within ______ months after the overall framework 
agreement has been approved by the two communities in separate referendums. 
57. A timetable will be established for the further reduction to an agreed level of 
the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot units and for the withdrawal of all 
non-Cypriot forces not provided for under the Treaty of Alliance. This timetable 
will be fully implemented prior to the establishment of the federal republic and 
in phases parallel to the implementation of the programme of action set out in 
annex. 
58. The Treaty of Alliance will provide for the stationing in Cyprus of Greek and 
Turkish contingents of equal size and equipment not exceeding ______ persons 
each. The Greek contingent will be stationed in the federated state administered 
by the Greek Cypriot community and cannot enter the federated state 
administered by the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish contingent will be 
stationed in the federated state administered by the Turkish Cypriot community 
and cannot enter the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot 
community. 
59. The federal republic will maintain a federal force consisting of a Greek 
Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot unit of equal size and equipment not exceeding 
the size of the Greek and Turkish contingents, under the joint overall command 
of the president and the vice-president. The Greek Cypriot unit will be stationed 
in the federated state administered by the Greek Cypriot community. The 
Turkish Cypriot unit will be stationed in the federated state administered by the 
Turkish Cypriot community. The president and the vice-president will jointly 
decide on the locations of the units. 
60. There will not be any reserve force and any military or paramilitary training 
of civilian groups. 
61. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot units will promote mutual respect, 
friendship, and closer relations between the two communities and foster their ANNEXES 
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welfare by carrying out joint social service activities throughout the federal 
republic. 
62. Each federated state and the federal republic will have a police force. All 
paramilitary activities and the ownership of weapons other than those licensed 
for hunting will be outlawed throughout the federal republic and any infraction 
will be a federal offense. The importation or transit of weapons and other 
military equipment other than that duly approved by the federal government will 
be prohibited. 
63. Immediately after the approval of the overall framework agreement by the 
two communities in separate referendums, an interim monitoring committee will 
be established composed of the three guarantor powers, the two communities and 
the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which will be 
responsible for: 
(a) Monitoring the achievement of the agreed numerical balance of Greek and 
Greek Cypriot troops and equipment on the one hand and Turkish and Turkish 
Cypriot troops and equipment on the other hand to be implemented within 
______ months after the overall framework agreement has been approved by the 
two communities in separate referendums; 
(b) Monitoring the achievement of the agreed timetable for the further reduction 
to the agreed level of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot units and the 
withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces not provided for in the Treaty of Alliance 
prior to the establishment of the federal republic. 
64. The Treaty of Guarantee, in a manner consistent with the principles of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with which the 
federal republic will affirm its commitment, will provide for a supervision and 
verification committee comprising representatives of the guarantor powers and 
of the federal president and federal vice-president. The United Nations will 
provide the support personnel to assist the supervision and verification 
committee in carrying out its functions. 
65. The supervision and verification committee will be responsible for 
investigating any development which in the view of either the federal president 
or federal vice-president or any guarantor power is a threat to the security of 
either community or of the federal republic through on-site inspection and other 
methods the supervision and verification committee deems necessary. The 
supervision and verification committee will make recommendations for 
rectifying any situation it has established to be in contravention of the 
arrangements covered by the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance. The parties 
will be obligated to implement these recommendations promptly and in good 
will. 
66. The United Nations Security Council will be requested to revise the mandate 
of UNFICYP, including support of the supervision and verification committee. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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V. TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS 
67. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities agree on the territories 
of the federated states administered by each, taking into account the 1977 high-
level agreement. 
68. The map attached hereto sets out the territories of the two federated states. 
The territorial agreement shall be respected and will be included in the federal 
constitution. 
69. Persons affected by the territorial adjustments will have the option of 
remaining in the area concerned or relocating to the federated state administered 
by their own community. 
70. All necessary arrangements for the relocation of persons affected by 
territorial adjustments will be satisfactorily implemented before resettlements are 
carried out. The fund to be established related to displaced persons will be 
available for this purpose. 
71. The territorial adjustment will not affect the water resources available to each 
federated state. The water resources available throughout the federation will be 
allocated to the two federated states at a proportion at least equal to their 
respective current demand. 
VI. DISPLACED PERSONS 
72. The property claims of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot displaced persons 
are recognized and will be dealt with fairly on the basis of a time-frame and 
practical regulations based on the 1977 high-level agreement, on the need to 
ensure social peace and harmony, and on the arrangements set out below. 
A. Areas that will come under Greek Cypriot administration 
73. The first priority will be given to the satisfactory relocation of and support 
for Turkish Cypriots living in the area that will c ome under Greek Cypriot 
administration and to displaced persons returning to that area. 
74. Turkish Cypriots who in 1974 resided in the area that will come under Greek 
Cypriot administration will have the option to remain in their property or to 
request to receive a comparable residence in the area that will come under 
Turkish Cypriot administration. Turkish Cypriot displaced persons currently 
residing in the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration will have 
the option to receive comparable residence in that area, to return to their former 
residence, or to receive a comparable residence in the area that will come under 
Turkish Cypriot administration. 
75. A bi-communal committee will be established immediately after the overall 
framework agreement has been approved in the referendums to arrange for 
suitable housing for all persons affected by the territorial adjustments. 
B. Other areas under Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot administration ANNEXES 
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76. Each community will establish an agency to deal with all matters related to 
displaced persons. 
77. The ownership of the property of displaced persons, in respect of which those 
persons seek compensation, will be transferred to the ownership of the 
community in which the property is located. To this end, all titles of properties 
will be exchanged on a global communal basis between the two agencies at the 
1974 value plus inflation. Displaced persons will be compensated by the agency 
of their community from funds obtained from the sale of the properties 
transferred to the agency, or through the exchange of property. The shortfall in 
funds necessary for compensation will be covered by the federal Government 
from a compensation fund obtained from various possible sources such as 
windfall taxes on the increased value of transferred properties following the 
overall agreement, and savings from defense spending. Governments and 
international organizations will also be invited to contribute to the compensation 
fund. In this connection, the option of long-term leasing and other commercial 
arrangements may also be considered. 
78. Persons from both communities who in 1974 resided and / or owned property 
in the federated state administered by the other community or their heirs will be 
able to file compensation claims. Persons belonging to the Turkish Cypriot 
community who were displaced after December 1963 or their heirs may also file 
claims. 
79. Current permanent residents of Cyprus who at the time of displacement 
owned their permanent residence in the federated state administered by the other 
community and who wish to resume their permanent residence at that location 
may also select the option to return. 
80. Current permanent residents of Cyprus who at the time of displacement 
rented their permanent residence in the federated state administered by the other 
community and who wish to resume their permanent residence in that area will 
be given priority under the freedom of settlement arrangements. 
81. All claims must be filed within six months after the approval of the overall 
framework agreement. 
82. ______ thousand displaced persons who elect to return to their former 
permanent residence will be processed by the federated state concerned each 
year for ______ years. In addition, Maronites who in 1974 had their permanent 
residence in the federated state under the administration of the Turkish Cypriot 
community may elect to return to their properties. The two federated states will 
review the situation at the conclusion of the above mentioned period in the light 
of the experience gained. 
83. This period will begin after the resettlement and rehabilitation process arising 
from territorial adjustments are essentially completed. 
84. The settlement of those who select to return will take place after the persons 
who will be affected have been satisfactorily relocated. If the current occupant is 
also a displaced person and wishes to remain, or if the property has been EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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substantially altered or has been converted to public use, the former permanent 
resident will be compensated or will be provided an accommodation of similar 
value. 
85. Persons who are known to have been actively or are actively involved in acts 
of violence or incitement to violence and / or hatred against persons of the other 
community may, subject to due process of law, be prevented from returning to 
the federated state administered by the other community. 
VII. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SAFEGUARDS 
86. A priority objective of the federal republic will be the development of a 
balanced economy that will benefit equally both federated states. A major 
programme of action will be established to correct the economic imbalance and 
ensure economic equilibrium between the two communities through special 
measures to promote the development of the federated state administered by the 
Turkish Cypriot community. A special fund will be established for this purpose. 
Foreign Governments and international organizations will be invited by the 
Security Council to contribute to this fund. 
87. To help promote a balanced economy, persons may be employed throughout 
the federal republic at equal pay. 
88. To protect in particular the federated state administered by the Turkish 
Cypriot community, special measures and safeguards will be adopted to avoid 
adverse economic effects resulting from the establishment of the federal 
republic, for example as a result of the adoption of one currency and the 
establishment of one customs frontier. 
89. Each federated state may, in addition to federal taxation, establish and 
administer its own tax regime and determine tax rates in line with its economic 
objectives and needs. 
90. In line with annex F, part II, of the Treaty of Establishment, the federal 
republic will accord most favoured nation treatment to Greece and Turkey in 
connection with all agreements whatever their nature. 
91. A bi-communal committee will be established as part of the transitional 
arrangements to prepare the special programmes and measures envisaged above 
prior to the establishment of the federal republic. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) will provide the committee with support. The 
committee may request other expert assistance as required. 
92. Matters related to the membership of the federal republic in the European 
Economic Community will be discussed and agreed to, and will be submitted for 
the approval of the two communities in separate referendums. (This paragraph 
relates exclusively to arrangements that might be put in place in Cyprus and in 
no way impinges upon the prerogatives of the European Community and its 
member states in matters concerning membership in the Community). ANNEXES 
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VIII. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
93. Immediately after the approval in separate referendums of the overall 
framework agreement on Cyprus, the following transitional arrangements will be 
carried out to implement t he overall framework agreement, including the 
preparation and putting into force of the federal constitution. All transitional 
arrangements will be fully implemented in an 18- month period. 
94. In line with this overall framework agreement, bi-communal committees will 
be established immediately to implement the provisions related to the 
preparation and putting into force of the federal constitution and electoral law, 
the establishment of the federal civil service, property settlement claims, 
economic development and safeguards, arrangements related to the territorial 
adjustments to take effect at the time the federal republic is established, and the 
programme of action set out in the appendix. Furthermore, a committee 
composed of the representatives of the g uarantor powers and the two 
communities will be established to supplement the Treaties of Guarantee and of 
Alliance. The United Nations will assist each committee in fulfilling its 
functions. Each side may employ foreign experts. 
95. In addition, a committee composed of the leaders of the two communities 
and a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations will be 
established immediately to work out the transitional arrangements procedures 
foreseen herein and to ensure that the functions of t he above mentioned 
committees are implemented in an effective and timely manner. Furthermore, 
this committee will, within 30 days of its completion by the two leaders at a 
high-level international meeting, organize separate referendums to approve the 
overall framework agreement, and, at the appropriate time during the transitional 
period, organize separate referendums to approve the federal constitution and the 
elections of federal officials with the assistance of and verification by the United 
Nations. 
96. During the transitional period, the current arrangements for the 
administration of the day-to-day internal affairs of each side will continue, unless 
modified by the provisions of the overall framework agreement. In matters 
affecting Cyprus as a whole, such as international trade and tourism, the same 
principle shall apply on the understanding that these matters will be administered 
on an interim basis in the common interest. To this end, interim procedures will 
be agreed to by the two communities. 
97. During the transitional period, external affairs shall be conducted in a manner 
which accords with the principles contained in the overall framework agreement 
and in consensus with the leaders of the two communities. Arrangements shall be 
made for joint delegations, in particular to international meetings. 
98. The statutes, laws, regulations, rules, contracts currently in effect on both 
sides shall be considered valid to the extent they are not inconsistent with the 
overall framework agreement. The federal government may review prior 
international agreeements to determine whether any action should be taken in 
respect thereto. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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99. Each community will prepare its federated state constitution and electoral 
law in line with the federal constitution and electoral law, and will organize its 
federated state governmental arrangements which shall both come into being at 
the same time that the federal republic is established. 
100. The date of entry into force of the federal constitution will be specified 
therein and will be the date on which the federal republic comes into being. 
IX. NOTIFICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
101. As soon as the overall framework agreement has been approved in separate 
referendums by each community, the leaders of the two communities will 
address a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting to 
him the text of the overall framework agreement with the request that he submit 
the letter and the overall framework agreement to the Security Council so that 
the Council may take note of the decision of the two communities to establish a 
federal republic in the manner described in the overall framework agreement. 
APPENDIX 
As soon as the overall framework agreement has been approved by the two 
communities in separate referendums the following programme of action to 
promote goodwill and close relations between the two communities will be 
implemented. 
1. The flow of persons and goods, services, capital, communication, and 
international assistance from and / or to Cyprus will take place on an equal basis 
throughout Cyprus and any restrictions to the contrary will be lifted. 
2. All restrictions on travel by members of the Turkish Cypriot community will 
be lifted. The two communities will agree on interim procedures. 
3. The restrictions on the movement of tourists will be lifted. 
4. Objections to the participation in international sport and cultural activities will 
be lifted. 
5. The freedom of movement will be facilitated subject, by way of agreement 
between the two communities, only to minimal procedures. 
6. Pending the establishment of the federal republic, Varosha will be placed 
under United Nations administration and a programme of action for its 
restoration will be prepared and implemented. 
7. All military modernization programmes and strengthening of positions will 
cease. The two sides will cooperate with UNFICYP in extending the unmanning 
of positions along the buffer zone to all areas where the troops of both sides 
remain in close proximity to each other. The freedom of movement of UNFICYP 
throughout Cyprus will be ensured. 
8. A bi-communal committee will be established to review the textbooks used in 
schools on each side and make recommendations for the removal of material that ANNEXES 
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is contrary to the promotion of goodwill and close relations between the two 
communities. The committee may also recommend positive measures to promote 
that objective. 
9. Both communities will promote goodwill and close relations between them 
and friendly relations with Greece and Turkey. 
10. Both communities will,  within the limits of their authority, terminate all 
current or pending recourse before an international body against the other 
community or Greece or Turkey. 
11. A bi-communal committee will be established to survey the water situation in 
Cyprus and make r ecommendations on ways of meeting the water needs of 
Cyprus, including from external sources. The committee may request expert 
assistance as required. 
12. A bi-communal committee will be established to prepare and launch a 
programme of action for the restoration of historical and religious sites 
throughout Cyprus. The committee may request expert assistance as required. 
13. A bi-communal committee will be established to undertake a population 
census of both communities. The committee may request expert assistance as 
required. 
14. The two communities undertake to support the efforts of the Committee on 
Missing Persons to reach early conclusions wherever possible on the fate of the 
missing persons. To this end, the Committee is requested to undertake without 
delay the investigation of all cases of missing persons and, to this end, to 
reassess the criteria for arriving at conclusions on the fate of the missing. EMERSON AND TOCCI 
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Map of Cyprus as proposed by the UN in 1992 
Note: the shaded line represents the actual cease-fire  line. The sharp black line 
represents the UN proposal. The black shaded areas are the British sovereign 
military bases. 